Tag: 2019October

  • Hate Crimes in Spain not as they Seem

    Some years ago I read about a small theatre in Moscow staging hard-hitting plays critical of Official Russia. It goes without saying that the authorities did not take kindly to Teatr.doc and its founders, Mikhail Ugarov and Elena Gremina (who both died of heart attacks within six weeks of each other in 2018).[i]

    In 2014 Moscow City Council closed the theatre on a planning technicality regarding the location of a window. Then, in 2018, nine of the theatre’s actors were arrested for ‘unlawfully drinking alcohol in central Moscow.’[ii] And in August of this year, unknown assailants stormed the stage during a gay-themed play.

    But despite all the bureaucratic obstacles put in its way, Teatr.doc continues because even a regime like Putin’s baulks at blatantly shutting down a tiny theatre – it prefers to use legal levers to stifle dissent.

    Unfortunately, Putin’s regime is not alone in basing its repression on the ‘rule of law’. Erdogan’s Turkey is also at it. Even in the EU, Poland, Hungary and Spain are using repressive legislation and compliant judges to shut down non-conformism.

    Flawed Democratic Transition in Spain

    The case of Spain is the most alarming because few people are aware of the problems there. Ever since dictator Francisco Franco died in 1975, the country has been portrayed as the poster child for a transition from totalitarianism to democracy. But, as is often the case with the family of an alcoholic who falls off the wagon, its friends are ignoring the warning signs, hoping that it’ll right itself, and turning a blind eye to lapses.

    Problems have long dogged the fledgling democracy. In the mid-1980s, the then Socialist government organised death squads against those suspected of links to Basque terrorist organisation ETA. A few bureaucrats and a senior minister even spent a few months behind bars for their role in the scandal.

    Then in the late 1990s, judges shut down a number of Basque nationalist publications on the grounds that they were financing ETA. The conservative prime minister at the time, Jose Maria Aznar, even boasted ‘Did anyone believe we wouldn’t dare close [them] down?’[iii] An unusual thing to say in a democracy supposedly with a Separation of Powers.

    Most disturbing of all, journalists from those publications served jail sentences of up to eleven years. The closures of all the publications were later – too late for those who had been jailed –found by Spain’s higher courts to have been unlawful.

    the ‘Gag Law’

    Those cases could be written off as once-in-a-decade incidents caused by disconcertion in responding to a terrorist campaign. But since 2015, new legislation – the Organic Law for Citizens’ Security, colloquially known as the ‘Gag Law’ – has allowed the authorities to clamp down on free speech, free assembly and peaceful acts of civil disobedience.

    Complementing the Gag Law is anti-discrimination legislation – known as ‘hatred offences’ – which was introduced to deal with, for example, racism and sexism but is increasingly being used to prosecute people on ideological grounds. And from looking at official statistics, it’s clear that such legislation is being disproportionately employed in two regions: Catalonia and the Basque Country.

    In 2017, the last year for which official figures are available,[iv] there were 1,418 ‘hatred offenses’ in Spain. Of these, 36% were prosecuted in Catalonia and 10% in the Basque provinces. That means almost half of all cases in two regions accounted for just a fifth of the population.

    ‘ideological hatred’

    And when hatred offenses are broken down, ‘ideological hatred’ in Catalonia accounted for 42% of all cases nationally. There’s an explanation for this.

    Since the beginning the decade, Catalan nationalism has gone from being satisfied with devolution within Spain to demanding a referendum on independence. After being stonewalled by the government in Madrid, they went ahead and organised one on their own. The conservative government at the time responded by sending in thousands of riot police to requisition ballot boxes. In carrying this out, the police beat voters with truncheons and fired rubber bullets into crowds queuing outside polling stations.

    The images were seen around the world and proved a PR disaster for Spain, which has since then tried to dismiss these events as ‘fake news’ and ‘Catalan propaganda’. The Supreme Court in Madrid is now deliberating on the fate of twelve Catalan leaders accused of violent rebellion, sedition and embezzlement for organising the referendum. They face up to twenty-five-years behind bars.

    Going hand-in-hand with the trial of the leaders is a lower level persecution of ordinary Catalans, who publicly display separatist sympathies. Many are charged with ‘ideological hatred’. And while the cases are often thrown out by the courts, on account of risible evidence, the stress of being charged and the cost of hiring a legal team might deter democratic expression of political opinions. Thus, the threat of prosecution allows the state to persecute without explicitly having to do so.

    Other targets

    That said, Catalan nationalists aren’t the only ones being targeted. The Podemos mayor of Cadiz, José María González Santos, is standing trial[v] at the time of writing on an ‘ideological hatred’ charge. He has been accused of ‘hatred of Israel’ in response to cancelling a run of Israeli movies during a film festival. Also a Barcelona University professor is being investigated for ‘calumny’[vi] after claiming that prisoners are tortured in Catalan prisons.

    Other almost comical cases that have made headlines are those of a clown with a red nose[vii] who stood beside a policeman and a car mechanic[viii] who refused to service the vehicle of a police officer. Both were Catalans and both were charged with ‘ideological hatred’. Both cases were thrown out, but not after the accused had endured months of uncertainty.

    Both cases also serve to highlight how legislation designed to protect minorities is being used to persecute members of a national minority in order to protect police from perceived slights. As the former interior minister, the conservative judge Jose Ignacio Zoido said: ‘All those who have disrespected the forces and corps of security of the state will pay for it in the courts.’[ix]

    One such case is that of Catalan satirical magazine El Jueves, which was charged with ‘hatred’[x] for a cartoon saying that cocaine supplies had run out in Catalonia because of all the riot police sent there from the rest of Spain. While people who protested outside a hotel hosting said riot police were also investigated for ‘hatred.’[xi]

    Against the Constitution?

    The crime of ‘hating’ police has given rise to some controversy among legal academics. Professor Joaquin Urias, a constitutional law expert at Seville University, has argued that ‘it can’t be applied to protect an institution.’ He added: ‘Accepting that hating the police is a criminal offence could insert us into a terrible spiral of repression.’ He was responding to the so-called ‘Alsasua 8’[xii] youths, who were jailed for between two and thirteen years for public disorder offences and ‘ideological discrimination’ after a bar fight with two off-duty policemen.

    Perhaps the most notorious cases are those of the puppeteers Alfonso Lazaro de la Fuente and Raul Garcia, who spent three days in jail, and the TV comedian Dani Mateo, who is Catalan. The puppeteers were charged with ‘hatred’ and ‘glorifying terrorism’ after parents complained about a banner held by one of the puppets in a children’s matinee in Madrid. They endured an eleven-month ordeal from their arrest to the judge striking out the case. Meanwhile, Mateo was charged with ‘hatred’ for appearing to blow his nose on a Spanish flag during a TV sketch. His ordeal lasted a mere three months.

    The situation is, to put it mildly, an affront to democracy. Amnesty International has said that it is having ‘a profoundly chilling effect, creating an environment in which people are increasingly afraid to express alternative views, or make controversial jokes.’

    Esteban Beltran, Director of Amnesty International Spain, added: ‘Sending rappers to jail for song lyrics and outlawing political satire demonstrates how narrow the boundaries of acceptable online speech have become in Spain.’

    He continues: ‘People should not face criminal prosecution simply for saying, tweeting or singing something that might be distasteful or shocking. Spain’s broad and vaguely worded law is resulting in the silencing of free speech and the crushing of artistic expression.’

    What next?

    The current caretaker government of Socialist Pedro Sanchez indicated while in opposition that it would address these worrying trends. But despite being in power for more than a year, it has done nothing other than to set up a propaganda ministry, Global Spain, which aims to fight the ‘disinformation’ about the state of democracy spread by, wait for it, ‘the enemies of Spain.’

    What can be done to make Spain change course? With four of the five big parties in its parliament fully behind the idea that Spain is protecting democracy by clamping down on freedom of expression, there are appears to be little hope. Foreign criticism, such as claims that there are political prisoners in its jails, makes the Spanish establishment bristle. But perhaps more concerted criticism from the EU and its member states might have an effect. We won’t know until the EU speaks out – up till now, it has chosen to look the other way.

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    [i] Sophia Kishkovsky, ‘Moscow Theater Rebels, Husband and Wife, Are Dead’, June 8th, 2018, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/obituaries/gremina-and-ugarov-russia-teatr-doc-die.html

    [ii] Katie Davies, ‘Actors from Russia’s independent Teatr.doc detained by Moscow police’, July 5th, 2018, The Calvert Journal, https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/10464/actors-from-russias-independent-teatr.doc-detained-by-moscow-police.

    [iii] Jose Miguel Larraya, ‘”¿Alguien pensaba que no nos íbamos a atrever a cerrar ‘Egin’?”’ July 23rd, 1998, El País, https://elpais.com/diario/1998/07/23/espana/901144814_850215.html

    [iv] http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/10180/7146983/ESTUDIO+INCIDENTES+DELITOS+DE+ODIO+2017+v3.pdf/5d9f1996-87ee-4e30-bff4-e2c68fade874

    [v] Untitled, ‘José María González ‘Kichi’ declara en el juzgado por cancelar un ciclo de cine israelí’, September 17th, 2019, Diario de Cadiz, https://www.diariodecadiz.es/cadiz/Jose-Maria-Gonzalez-Kichi-declara-juzgado_0_1392460911.html.

    [vi] Untitled, ‘El juez admite la querella de CCOO e imputa a un profesor de la UB por decir que en las prisiones “hay torturas”’ September 19th, 2019, eldiario.es, https://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/sociedad/querella-CCOO-profesor-UB-prisiones_0_942806331.html

    [vii] Jordi Pessaradona, ‘Imputado por un delito de odio el concejal catalán de la nariz de payaso’, February 23rd, 2018, Público, https://www.publico.es/politica/imputado-delito-odio-concejal-catalan-nariz-payaso.html

    [viii] Jordi Cabre, ‘Archivado el caso del mecánico de Reus acusado de delito de odio’, 23rd of March, 2019, Diari de Tarragona, https://www.diaridetarragona.com/reus/Archivado-el-caso-del-mecanico-de-Reus-acusado-de-delito-de-odio-20190325-0057.html

    [ix] Carles Villalonga, ‘Delito de odio: ¿uso o abuso?’, March 4th, 2018, La Vanguardia, https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20180304/441143656491/delito-odio-incitacion-violencia.html

    [x] Pascual Serrano, ‘El delito de odio, la revista ‘El Jueves’ y la Policía’, November 14th, 2017, Público, https://blogs.publico.es/otrasmiradas/11541/el-delito-de-odio-la-revista-el-jueves-y-la-policia/

    [xi] Javier Álverez, ‘Fiscalía investiga por delitos de odio y amenazas la expulsión de los policías de los hoteles’, October 3rd, 2017, Seiz, https://cadenaser.com/ser/2017/10/03/tribunales/1507017054_809275.html

    [xii] Guy Hedgecoe ‘Ghost of ETA refuses to fade for Spanish Right’ June 9th, 2019, politico.eu https://www.politico.eu/article/eta-spanish-right-basque-country-alsasua/

  • Public Intellectuals: Jürgen Habermas

    It came as a surprise when the editor of Cassandra Voices divulged recently that he had never read any works by Jürgen Habermas (1929 – ), who I regard as a strong contender to be the greatest living public intellectual. I put this down to limitations inherent in his generation, so I felt compelled to expand on the wisdom and complexity of this towering figure – among the last in the line of transcendent, rigorous intellectuals of the Old Left.

    It is perhaps a partial Germanic background that predisposes my appreciation of Habermas, and I frequently reference his work. Clearly not to everyone’s taste, a technical, and at times dense prose writer, he is not a model stylist. The salient points he makes are, however, of substance, lying as they do in an embrace of communality, anti-extremism and moderation.

    Habermas’s intellectual origins are in Critical Theory and he was, as we shall see, at one time an adherent of the Frankfurt School, and a committed Marxist (he remains Marxist in orientation, but his intellectual voyage has taken him a long way clear). Having definitively broken from the Frankfurt School, he became a firm defender of rationality and Enlightenment Values, the very antithesis of the Designer Marxism of the Sorbonne that spawned this Post-Truth zeitgeist that I have previously written about.

    In essence, Habermas recovers the substantive aspects of rationality, and puts forward a theory of practical reasoning and political deliberation. He regards reason as emancipatory and an antidote to dogmatism, compulsion, and domination. The substance of law is particularly important to him – indeed he has expressed regret that he did not study law – and much of his writings are legal in character.

    Part of the Habermas project is to elevate the space of public deliberation and the Rule of Law above Postmodern scepticism. Arguably, embracing legal philosophy compelled him to focus on the particular rather than the general – empiricism rather than Continental philosophy.

    Background

    As a member of the Flakhelfer generation who came of age during the final phase of Wold War II, Habermas was tremendously influenced by the horrors of the Holocaust, which he first encountered in cinematic reels after the war.

    In response, he venerates the Rule of Law as a counterweight to the horrors of Nazism. Moreover, though at times he is withering in his assessment of the post-war West Germany state (‘the FDR’), his criticism remained constructive and democratic in orientation, anticipating a Third Way between conservatism and doctrinaire Marxism, while bypassing the Critical Theory festering in academia.

    In his early writings Habermas was anxious to depart from influential intellectuals such as Carl Schmitt, tainted by association with Nazism. He opposed veneration of the state, emphasising instead the importance of civil society.

    In contrast to Marxists – many of whom dismissed this as a form of bourgeois fetishization – Habermas emphasised the value of legality. He does not, however, endorse law uncritically. Thus he was sceptical initially of the role of the German Constitutional Court, which developed fundamental rights in a largely progressive fashion. Habermas regarded such judge-led laws as paternalistic. As indicated, he emphasised the importance of civil society engaging in rational discourse rather than a scheme of state-driven rights recognition.

    Furthermore, Habermas sought to reconcile legitimacy with legality. He puts significant store in constitutionalism and a right to civil disobedience, reviving a liberal-socialist argument against the unbending Postmodernists. Habermas argues for a structural transformation and reinvention of the public sphere.

    In his early writings Habermas was also anxious to promote a positive conception of democracy, based on principles of legality and popular sovereignty. He identified an eclipse in the public sphere in the FDR during 1950s, and argued that in place of reasoning and decision-making propaganda and acclamation held sway.

    Natural Law

    Habermas has been deeply critical of an idea of politics as a technical affair, emphasising instead the importance of plebiscite or Direct Democracy. He is critical of a growing tendency to devolve power to technocrats and administrators, seeing the legislative branch of government as the real guardian of constitutionality. He argues that negative liberties could be reinvented only as positive guarantees of participation within a unified state society.

    In his earlier writings he was also sceptical of civil and political rights and these negative liberties. However, from 1961 we see a shift in his writing, as he became more positive about rights. In particular he is influenced by a series of Federal Constitutional Court decisions, including the Luth/Harlan case, which reinforced positive liberties and had a radiating effect on private law. He commends the court for applying rights in a horizontal fashion, against private parties and for recognising a positive obligation to protect speech.

    Nonetheless, throughout his intellectual life he has remained sceptical of court-imposed solutions, and, unlike the American philosopher Dworkin, judges themselves.

    It should be stressed that Habermas has been opposed to the Natural Law orientation of the Federal Constitutional Court, and has always sedulously opposed Natural Law. As he put it ‘Natural Law is devoid of any and every convincing philosophical justification,’[i] a point I endorse.

    Democratic Deficits

    Between 1961 and 1964 Habermas railed against democratic deficits in the FDR, a state which he believed had been handed over to technocrats. Inherent was a distrust of scientization and its fundamental incapacity to grapple with ethical questions, applying to the pursuit of the ‘good life’. He argued that the normative considerations essential to a democracy were being occluded.

    In a prescient remark, anticipating our present commodification of human life he writes:

    In modelling itself on the natural sciences, a science of politics risks treating the human being more as an object than a subject of historical processes.[ii]

    Habermas coined the term decisionist, meaning political decisions taken in a technical fashion unharnessed to ethical considerations. To counter this he emphasised the importance of reason, arguing against the scientization of politics and suggesting that unless technical knowledge was translated into practical knowledge political power would remain substantively irrational. The public sphere was the only place for that translation and that act of translation is the only way to make ‘a scientized society, a rational one.’[iii]

    Habermas thus argues that technocratic thought distorts the proper relationship between science and politics, and that citizens of the state need to be included in the translation between science and politics; in other words democracy needs to be inclusive and direct, as a technocratic consciousness excludes practical ethical questions from public deliberation.

    Habermas suggests that ruling elites in reducing practical questions about the good life to mere technical problems, undermined public, rational democratic discussion of values by the public. This had the effect of masking the value-laden character of government decisions, generally in the service of ascendant capitalism.

    Today’s fumbling bureaucrats and trickle-down-austerity-merchants are the semi-educated heirs of Habermas’s technocratic elite, devoted to growth-without-end, while ignoring externalities such as ecological and environmental meltdown.

    Alas his countrywoman Angela Merkel and her Eurocrat friends succeeded, by proxy, in destroying the social fabric and human structure of Ireland and Greece through adherence to a savage doctrine of austerity. The imposition of technical solutions (‘reducing the deficit’) negated the moral dimension of their actions, upholding a value-laden ideology that worked to the benefit of a shrinking economic elite who prospered after ‘weathering the storm’, at the expense of the preponderance of the population who were left on the scrapheap.

    Herbert Marcuse

    Habermas distinguished himself from his friend and former Frankfurt school colleague Marcuse in his attitude towards technology.

    First, unlike Marcuse, he saw technology as a permanent fixture of the human condition. Secondly, while Marcuse leaned towards the idea of a technological Utopia, wherein emancipatory machines would free workers from of work, Habermas emphasised the importance of the institutional framework of choice, decision and practical deliberation, seeing the permanence of technology without its liberating consequences. Thus, he steered a middle course between the technocratic right and the Marxist left:

    today better utilisation of an unrealised potential leads to an improvement of the economic industrial apparatus but no longer eo ipso to a transformation of the institutional framework with emancipatory consequences.[iv]

    He would surely despair at the mass surveillance of the internet, social media and automation, including a reconstitution of human identity through information technology. These are far from emancipatory consequences of technology. Automation and robotic capitalism will not award people more time to achieve leisure and growth.

    Communicative Action

    In 1968 Habermas introduces his key theory of Communicative Action, where he lays out his contention that the Left had incorrectly assumed that a change in the mode of production would automatically result in desirable changes in the relations of production. He argued that the technocratic approach of the Right and this Left utopianism converged in that each viewed politics as no longer requiring legitimation.

    In place of these, Habermas proposes a shift from a technocratic politics to concepts of work-interaction and communicative action:

    I suspect that the general relation of institutional framework (interaction) and subsystems of purposive rational action (work in the broad sense of instrumental and strategic action) is more suited than historic materialism to reconstructing the sociocultural phases of the history of mankind.[v]

    He further argues that:

    It becomes clear that two concepts of rationalisation must be distinguished. rationalisation at the level of the institutional framework can occur only in the medium of interaction itself, that is by removing restrictions on communication.[vi]

    Habermas also distinguished between technical reason and substantive or communicative reason, which he argued was vitally important: ‘The institutional organisation of society continues to be a problem of practice related to communication, not one of technology, no matter how scientifically guided.’[vii]

    Habermas argued thus for a domination-free communication, and that ideology systematically distorted communication. His argument is for universal pragmatics:

    By reconstructing the conditions of possible communication Habermas hoped to identify the elements necessarily presupposed in the successful exchange of speech acts and thereby to uncover the universal validity basis of speech.[viii]

    Habermas asserted that through language, speakers adopt a practical stance oriented toward ‘reaching understanding,’ which he regards as an ‘inherent telos’ of speech. When individuals address each other in this manner, they engage in what Habermas calls ‘communicative action,’ which he distinguishes from strategic forms of social action

    In communicative action:

    speakers coordinate their action and pursuit of individual (or joint) goals on the basis of a shared understanding that the goals are inherently reasonable or merit-worthy. Whereas strategic action succeeds insofar as the actors achieve their individual goals, communicative action succeeds insofar as the actors freely agree that their goal (or goals) is reasonable, that it merits cooperative behavior. Communicative action is thus an inherently consensual form of social coordination in which actors “mobilize the potential for rationality” given with ordinary language and its telos of rationally motivated agreement.[ix]

    speech acts

    Over the course of a decade the theory of universal pragmatics culminated in a theory of justice as fairness of communication. In this Habermas was influenced by the English positivist John Austin and his idea of ideal speech, arguing with respect to speech acts that:

    In uttering a speech act, the speaker unavoidably raises validity claims which can only be redeemed in a discourse having the structure of an ideal speech situation. However, distorted the actual conditions of communication may be, every competent speaker possesses the means of the construction of a speech situation which would be free from domination and in which disputes concerning the truth of statements or the correctness of norms could be rationally resolved.[x]

    In his recent writings he has amplified on speech acts and identifies four ‘pragmatic presuppositions’ essential, he argues, to communicative rationality:

    • no one capable of making a relevant contribution has been excluded,
    • participants have equal voice,
    • they are internally free to speak their honest opinion without deception or self-deception, and
    • there are no sources of coercion built into the process and procedures of discourse.[xi]

    The essence of all of this is the idea of inclusive critical discussion, free of social and economic pressures, in which all involved treat each other as equals in a cooperative attempt to reach an understanding on matters of common concern.

    In this context Habermas harks back to the salons of the Enlightenment, and claimed that as mass societies emerged over the course of the 19th century, ideas became commodities, assimilated to the economics of mass media consumption.

    Habermas sought to revive this tradition of free-ranging thought in attempting to re-install public reason, and calls for a socio-institutionally feasible concept of public opinion-formation that is historically meaningful, and which normatively meets the requirements of the social-welfare state, and which is theoretically clear and empirically identifiable. He argues that this: ‘can be grounded only in the structural transformation of the public sphere itself and in the dimension of its development.’[xii]

    During this period, Habermas also evaluated the German Sociologist Max Weber seeing in his compatriot’s thought an iron cage of modernity, assigning law and morality to different spheres of rationality. Law required, Habermas argued, a rational justification in contrast to Weber’s positivism equating legality with legitimacy.

    Habermas asserted a need for the law to be justified not simply in technocratic terms, but also in terms of principle or practical moral justification. Law, he argued, was intimately linked to morality and politics and to the constitutional organisation of political power.

    Civil Disobedience

    Habermas was a man of his time, and like Albert Camus, engaged with its controversies. Thus from 1978-87 he turned to the question of civil disobedience in response to what was happening in Germany, especially in response to protests against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

    Habermas defended civil disobedience and endorsed John Rawls view that this was a morally grounded act, which must appeal to publicly recognised principles. He argued that state legitimacy was intimately connected to the normative quality of the state in arguing for a representative democracy that held a place for civil disobedience.

    Habermas saw civil disobedience of a peaceful nature as a revitalising force, and rejected the authoritarian legalism of Conservatives. Instead he placed faith in dissenting citizen, and saw the German state as a self-revitalising project animated by a noninstitutionalised mistrust of itself.

    At this time Habermas set his sights on Postmodernism. In fact, he called young conservatives antimodernists, old conservatives premodernisms and neo-conservatives postmodernist (such as the Green party who, in a quasi-Luddite way, argued against aspects of modernity) and rejected all three.

    Instead Habermas placed his faith in a concept of communicative rationality with reason centre stage. He would be in his element attacking the way in which post-modernist relativistic nonsense has been co-opted by the Alt-Right and the Neoconservatives.

    More recently, Habermas has emphasised the values of law, politics and the Rule of Law. In fact, he argues that democracy and the Rule of Law are co-original and presuppose each other. He argues for popular sovereignty in conjunction with human rights as the legitimacy of laws; prioritising popular sovereignty and a proceduralist theory as an alternative to ideology. He puts his trust in the productive forces of communication.

    Habermas argues that breaking up legislative power into institutionalised and noninstitutionalised spaces – the parliament and the plurality of public spheres – was the best way to achieve the democratic ideal of self-determination. He saw the noninstitutionalised distrust of the citizen, reflected in civil disobedience, as central to a democracy.

    He explained that the ideal speech situation created the necessary formal or procedural framework within which the public could deliberate and fill in the picture of a good society. Within such a framework participants could decide the concrete possibilities of social organisation they desired.

    His position is summarised thus:

    Habermas dubs his position an “epistemic proceduralism.” The position is proceduralist because collective reasonableness emerges from the operation of the democratic process; it is epistemic insofar as that process results in collective learning. The latter presupposes a fruitful interplay of three major discursive arenas: the dispersed communication of citizens in civil society; the “media-based mass communication” in the political public sphere; and the institutionalized discourse of lawmakers. When these arenas work well together, civil society and the public sphere generate a set of considered public opinions that then influence the deliberation of lawmakers.[xiii]

    In conclusion

    Habermas saw German constitutionalism as an unfinished project and sought to offer a Third Way of democratic discussion between formalistic positivism and moralistic natural law. He is critical of the foisting of human rights on us by judges –  and was critical of the Dworkinean prioritising of the judiciary – placing faith instead in in popular sovereignty.

    He argues, nonetheless, that a system of rights constitutes a minimum set of normative institutional conditions for any legitimate modern political order, but that further institutional mechanisms such as legislatures and other branches of government must operate as an open society of interpreters of the constitution.

    These are the important values espoused by Habermas:

    1: The rule of law and legalism.

    2: Speech and communication untainted by ideology.

    3: The voyage of social passage from post-modernist nonsense to Enlightenment values.

    Interestingly, both Habermas and Noam Chomsky are of a similar vintage, and are perhaps the residues, or remnants, of a tradition of learning and rigour, which is now largely marginalised and ignored. Though he is often difficult to read in a stilted Germanic style derived from Kant through Heidegger and even Thomas Mann, his ideas are of vital relevance. The great challenge is to impart these, and gain an audience.

    A dialogue between secular non-extremist humanism and Christian non-extreme humanism.

    The following is a codicil to a recent piece I wrote on Jurgen Habermas as part of the Public Intellectuals series.

    I list ten crucial lessons and interpretations from the man I regard as the leading public intellectual of our time who bridges schools of thought in a way similar to Edmund Burke, and with more rigour. Habermas was scorned by the agitprop leftists in Germany after he spoke out against a growing extremism as he read it.

    1. Habermas was correct to abandon postmodernism such as that identified by the Frankfurt School, and replace it with rationalist ideology whether Christian or secularist. We need to reunite through reason against the dark forces in the world.
    2. His crucial idea of communicative action and ideal speech invites us to talk in neutral conditions purged of ideology. This has led me to advocate for a world council composed of non-corporate, non-business, apolitical leaders apart from those who are properly rational, which includes Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin. Independent think tanks. Let us talk and argue but not fall out and scream at each other any longer.
    3. Accept religion from an atheist perspective, all to their own. Spirtuality is not to be despised, and we need a communication about ethics and morality. A common ground.
    4. Avoid all extremism. It is counter-productive, whether leftist or rightist. That includes religious fundamentalists and atheist bashers of religion. An interdisciplinary dialogue between faith and reason, a reasoned faith, is needed to confront the problems of the world.
    5. Society should run using technocratic methods with ethical and moral components. Vorsprung durch technik, Germany works but has inflicted its model work practices to liquidate much of Europe. Merkel is not Helmut Schmidt.
    6. Embrace the intellectual tradition and raise our civilisation. Nuance is key.
    7. Democracy is enriched by dissidence, protest and a sense of community beyond parties. but not agitprop doomsday cults.
    8. In certain jurisdictions judicial and other elites cannot be trusted. Too many are now compromised. We need fresh ideas and perspectives.
    9. The United States is on the brink and should not be deferred to. The global challenge of silicon valley needs to be challenged, just as we should be challenging the encroachment of China.
    10. Continue to resist the intellectual and political legacies of both Nazism and Marxist-Leninism.

    [i] Jürgen Habermas: Natural Law and Revolution (1963), p. 113

    [ii] Matthew Specter: Habermas: An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.93

    [iii] Ibid, p. 97

    [iv] Habermas: Technik und Disenchant ales Ideologies (1968) p99.

    [v] Ibid, p.92.

    [vi] Ibid, p.98.

    [vii] Ibid, pp.78-79

    [viii] Specter, p.???

    [ix] Habermas: Stanford Internet Encyclopedia.

    [x] John B. Thompson and David Helds: Habermas: Critical Debates, M.I.T Press., Cambridge,  pp.8-9

    [xi] Habermas: Stanford Internet Encyclopedia. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/

    [xii] Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, (translated by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence), M.I.T. Press, 1989,  p.244.

    [xiii] Habermas: Stanford Internet Encyclopedia, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/

  • Himself and the Bicycle

    Sure, he was only a little lad of 4ft 10ins. Little Paddy, I called him. He was eighty-two-years-old when I was twelve-years-old, but he was great craic.

    Little Paddy was a bogman. He lived in the bog of Derrycoffey. Think he was the last to live in that bog. I used to meet him all the time along the Tore road, wheeling a big black Raleigh bicycle.

    Well, that small of a man made the bicycle look huge. He wore a fedora hat and the smallest topcoat I ever saw upon a man. Never rode the bicycle. His legs were not long enough to reach the pedals. Oh God, no.

    The bicycle had two purposes. One, to balance him, and he full to the gills with porter. He loved a sup of porter and would walk the five miles from Derrycoffey bog to the village of Tyrrellspass, wheeling the bicycle there and back. Sober going into the village and mouldy drunk coming home.

    He would have two bags of shopping upon the handlebars of this bicycle. It be at a slant of about fifteen degrees, and himself be slanted about the same fifteen degrees into the bicycle. It was like a circus act and no way could he fall, no matter how drunk, the bicycle kept him up.

    I used to love seeing him coming along the quiet Tore road during the 1970s. No matter if I met him drunk or sober, it was the same every time. He would stop about twenty feet ahead of me upon the far side of the road and say nothing. Just stare.

    Then he would pull his topcoat to one side, and snarl. ‘Make your play, Mister. Draw for your gun.’ The shoot-out would begin, bang, bang, bang, with finger pistols. Me being a young lad, I always let little Paddy win. Because as I would fall to the road, riddled with imaginary bullets, little Paddy would keep firing. And every time he fired, I would do another roll, like another bullet passing through my corpse.

    It was great craic, and little Paddy be stood blowing gunsmoke from that finger gun he made. ‘Another one bites the dust,’ he would say. We done this religiously for several years.

    He was an amusing and entertaining little lad, living alone in a lonely bog. I cut turf for little Paddy one time, and I must admit I did feel sad for him, when I saw how he overcame his loneliness and isolation.

    He be going about the house, giving out to a dog that wasn’t there. He had no dog. Only the one he pretended to have. The same with the woman. Kept referring to “Herself, the Missus,” but he had no wife. He was an ol bachelor.

    The Missus was in fact a plain woman’s frock hanging from a nail behind the kitchen door, and a plain pair of women’s shoes beneath them. You could see by the dust and turf mould, they had been untouched in years.

    The Missus and the dog were his imagination’s way of beating the loneliness of his isolation. I never knew him once but to be full of sport and craic. I never knew him to be any other way but humble and happy, and always ready for the imaginary shoot-out with me.

    The first day I was cutting the turf for little Paddy, and at dinner time he said ‘We will go to the house for grub.’

    It was primitive. No gas nor electricity, just the turf fire to cook upon. On that hot summers day, he opened a drawer to the Welsh dresser in the kitchen and five or six big bluebottle flies flew out. ‘Will you have a lump of bacon, Young Nick?’ 

    ‘Ah God no, Paddy,’ says I.

    ‘Ah what ails you, Young Nick? You been working hard. Surely you will eat a lump of good mait (meat)?’

    ‘Ah God no, Paddy. I’m grand, thanks. Sure, didn’t I eat yesterday? And today I’m still full up from all I ate yesterday.’ I didn’t have the heart to tell him the mait full of bluebottles had sickened me to look at, let alone eat. Poor ole Paddy ate the mait himself. He knew little or nothing about hygiene, but what a great character of a man he was. He lived till his late 80s and yet I never knew him to be sick a day in his life.

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    Nick Feery is The Boy from Tore. He writes from memories of the times, as a boy in the 1970s, Nick walked and read the land and lakes of rural Tore in Ireland’s County Westmeath. Feery feels the past lives of his own ancestors and many others remain in that land, as they left it just so.

  • No Comment: A Horse for my Kingdom

    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
    An auction for a horse at Balinasloe Horse Fair. September 2019, Co. Galway, Connacht, Ireland.
  • Spain’s Grand Inquisitors Send Out an ‘Indisputable Message’

    Repost…

    The year is 1500 and Jesus Christ returns – to the city of Seville in Spain. There he performs a sequence of miracles, whereupon he is arrested and hauled before the Grand Inquisitor, as imagined by Ivan Karamazov – a character from Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s 1880 novel, The Brothers Karamazov.

    In his infinite mercy he walked once again among men, in the same human image in which he had walked for three years among men fifteen centuries earlier.

    Surprisingly the aged Grand Inquisitor is decidedly unwelcoming to the putative messiah, warning him that ‘man seeks to bow down before that which is indisputable, so indisputable that all men at once would agree to the universal worship of it.’ There can be no muddying of the message; this interloper cannot be permitted to renew the Christian gospel.

    He resolves to hide the true Christ’s identity from the masses, ‘for this time we shall not allow you to come to us’, and intends to burn him as a heretic. He acknowledges: ‘We shall deceive them again, for this time we shall not allow you to come to us. This deceit will constitute our suffering, for we shall have to lie.’

    The Grand Inquisitor holds those under his power in low esteem: ‘never will they able to share among themselves.’ Instead they should marvel at their rulers: ‘man seeks to bow down before that which is indisputable, so indisputable that all men at once would agree to the universal worship of it.’

    In addition, he adds, ‘we will allow them to sin, too; they are weak and powerless, and they will love us like children for allowing them to sin.’[i]

    Five centuries later in Spain, a new breed of Grand Inquisitor sits atop the judicial tree, sending out an indisputable message, insisting on the territorial unity of the state under the rule of corrupt men, who appear to see women as ‘fair game’, and where left-wing and secessionist parties are subjected to espionage and fake news stories calculated to discredit them.

    For the past year, nine Catalan leaders have been incarcerated before being tried on charges of violent rebellion for the crime of holding a peaceful independence referendum. A leaked text message from a leading Partido Popular (PP) senator claimed a proposed carve up with the Socialist government of judicial appointments, which would see the trial’s presiding judge, Manuel Marchena, being made president of the Supreme Court would allow conservative forces to dominate the judiciary ‘through the back door’.[ii] Legal experts in Spain say that a guilty verdict seems a foregone conclusion, with a draconian sentence of up to twenty years in prospect.

    Moreover, bizarrely, the Far Right party, Vox, has been permitted to act as a third ‘people’s prosecutor’ along with the public prosecutor and state’s council.[iii]

    The treatment of the Catalan leaders is in marked contrast to the leniency shown towards a group of men, coincidentally from Seville, calling themselves ‘the wolf pack’ who appear to have gang-raped a woman during San Fermin – the running of the bulls festival in Pamplona.

    In April 2018, all five were acquitted of rape, but found guilty of the lesser crime of ‘sexual abuse’. This came down to a fine point of law: as the men had not used violence to coerce the woman into the act, the crime could not technically be categorised as sexual assault, a crime which includes rape. The men were thus sentenced to nine years instead of the twenty-two to twenty-five years sought by the prosecution.

    On June 21st, however, there was another twist as the five men were released from jail on bail, pending an appeal against their sentences. In their decision, the judges said the men’s ‘loss of anonymity’ through the trial made it ‘unthinkable’ that they would attempt to flee the country or commit a similar crime.[iv] Or perhaps: “they are weak and powerless, and they will love us like children for allowing them to sin.”

    Most recently, Spain has been rocked by allegations of spying directed against the left-wing Podemos party and prominent Catalan nationalists. This surveillance was not justified by suspicion of any crime – it was simply the ruling party using the organs of state security to wage a dirty trick campaign against opposition parties. High-ranking officials in the Interior Ministry granted residency to a Venezuelan man in April 2016 in exchange for documents purporting to show the existence of offshore bank accounts belonging to its leader Pablo Iglesias and other Podemos leaders.

    Although these payments were revealed as bogus, the information was, nonetheless, circulated throughout national media, at a time when Podemos and the Socialists (PSOE) were negotiating over a possible government coalition.

    Recordings have been leaked featuring a police officer saying that whether the evidence is good or bad doesn’t matter, the only thing important is to be able to accuse Podemos of illegal party funding from Venezuela.[v] It was carried out in a way similar to how fake Swiss bank accounts were used to discredit the Catalan independence movement. In other words “We shall deceive them again, for this time we shall not allow you to come to us.”

    As the rest of Europe stares goggle-eyed at the Brexit drama, a more sinister drama is being played out on the Spanish stage, where three Grand Inquisitorial parties – the Partido Popular, Ciududanos and the Far Right newcomer, Vox, compete with one another in their vilification of Enemies of the One, True Spanish State – “so indisputable that all men at once would agree to the universal worship of it.”

    [i] Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, London, 2004, Vintage Classics, pp.248-259

    [ii] Eoghan Gilmartin and Tommy Greene, ‘The Republic on Trial’, 19th of February, 2019, The Jacobin, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/02/catalan-independence-trial-elections-referendum, accessed 29/4/19.

    [iii] Ibid

    [iv] Meagan Beatley, ‘The shocking rape trial that galvanised Spain’s feminists – and the far right’, April 23rd, 2019, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/23/wolf-pack-case-spain-feminism-far-right-vox, accessed 29/4/19.

    [v] Eoghan Gilmartin and Tommy Greene, ‘Assassinating Podemos’, April 11th, 2019, The Jacobin, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/04/podemos-spying-pablo-iglesias-psoe-elections, accessed 29/4/19.