Cassandra Voices

Tag: rights

  • Banksy and Protest Rights: The View from The Robing Room

    As I sauntered from the Old Bailey past the RCJ the Banksy painting caricaturing a judge attacking a protester was no longer even a ghostly shadow, but it very much remains in the public domain, after reports emerged that it had been reported as criminal damage.

    On September 25, on Old Brompton Road, a comprehensive exhibition of Banksy’s work opened, which brazenly included the mural stencilled onto a different surface. This raised all sorts of issues about the commercialization of art and the edge of protest, not to mention whether or not he should be prosecuted.

    Based on Fiat Justicia, Mr Bansky faces prosecution for the recent RCJ Mural as criminal damage. I also hear he may be charged with being in contempt of court, leading to his long anonymity being exposed. Being named and shamed is another feature of our hysterical times.

    Recently, a bit like the opening to a P.J. Wodehouse novel, an erudite discussion was held among learned friends in the robing room of Hove Crown Court, steered by the most venerable member, as to whether the t-shirts, now selling fast, of this auspicious work should be deemed the proceeds of crime. The consensus was that in the U.K., post-conviction, the seller is responsible. Perhaps that is fanciful, but you never know.

    Policy considerations were also broached, such as whether in prosecuting him would you create a martyr that would lead to more t-shirts being sold? Would the state then be complicit in facilitating crime not least by increasing his revenues.

    Charles Dickens, his work the subject of many copyright violations and thieving particularly by Americans in his lifetime, expressed the view in Bleak House that it was far, far better to have nothing to do with the law. Well, it is certainly far better for the law to have nothing to do with Banksy, or is it?

    The consensus in the robing room was that given he is profiting from the mural, there was a strong argument for a significant fine, with the trial perhaps being conducted through in camera proceedings, preserving his anonymity, with any receipts being diverted back into the criminal justice system.

    Further, the venerable member concluded that he was inciting protest. The discussion took place over an entire lunch, and if any of us were briefed it would have occupied many days of court time, but should it occupy any court time at all is the real question?

    Mr Banksy, I am reliably informed, arrived at around 4-5am masquerading as a delivery truck driver. There was just enough light to use his meticulously prepared stencil. It is not now simply guerilla art, but increasingly reflective on worrying times. Many people are in on the act.

    The recreated version of the mural by Diiego Rivera, known as Man, Controller of the Universe.

    Diego Rivera

    Among the greatest painters of murals was Diego Rivera. His famous mural in the Rockefeller Center in New York was taken down because of his cheeky insertion of Lenin contrary to the edicts of one of the citadels of world capitalism. They destroyed it in violation of copyright law. An integrity right protects a work from being destroyed, mutilated or defaced or put it in an inappropriate setting.

    Examples of violations include colorizing a black and white film such as The Maltese Falcon (1941), or including ad breaks during the Monty Python parrot sketch, or inserting cover ups of nudity, such as even in the Sistine Chapel, but outright destruction is rare. Indeed, there was uproar in Berlin when some of the murals on the Berlin wall were destroyed.

    The Banksy mural was an insertion of overtly political content in a work of art, and the destruction or censorship of protest art has always been a feature of oppressive regimes. So, was the reaction disproportionate or ill-thought out?

    Mr Banksy is a national treasure, and frankly as great an artists as any in England since Lucien Freud. I suspect any prosecution will backfire or has, revealing institutional incompetence and hubris.

    The Banksy mural has significant political implications and presents authoritarian judges and the state cracking down on protest, not least in response to legitimate public outrage over Gaza, but what’s good for the goose is also for the gander. It is legitimate political art, but the regulation of protest as opposed to protest art is more complex now.

    Jasper Johns’s ‘Flag’, Encaustic, oil and collage on fabric mounted on plywood,1954-55.

    Protest Rights.

    The flag of St George is also copyright protected, and very similar to the flag of Switzerland and indeed the Red Cross, but it has been traduced by maniacs spreading hatred and division. The visibility of the flag has increased significantly across England.

    It is now the case that English, Irish and indeed American national identity is as fragile as the American flag fractured and loose as in the Jasper Johns painting. The Irish tricolour is also a symbol of unity of green and orange, but is now potentially divisive. Extreme nationalism, along with racism, is one of the scourges of our time. It is a reversion in my view to the 1930’s – symptomatic of a new dark age.

    There is, of course, a marked distinction between genuine patriotism and the revival of tribalistic, exclusionary and racist nationalism. Not all patriotism to reference Jeremy Bentham is the refuge of the scoundrel.

    But racism and chauvinistic nationalism go hand in hand and generally morph into fascism. The target is the excluded other, now the immigrant. Nigel Farage is now proposing to remove those without a settled status.

    Timothy Snyder recently came off the fence in On Freedom (2024) labelling the alt-right fascists, after considering the etymology of the term. But is he also an enabler given some of the neoconservative views he has expressed?

    Let us cease bandying about anodyne terms like crypto-fascism and use language with precision and exactitude. There are now fascists and a gathering mob, but this has been engineered by, and is under the control of, others. Who then are the enablers is the crucial question?

    Is Banksy an enabler? I am not so sure

    Source: BBC.

    London Protests

    On the streets of central London recently I was reminded of three things: John Reed and Ten Days That Shook the World (1919), his blow-by-blow account of the Russian Revolution; the scene in Cabaret (1972) where, semi-fictitiously, Christopher Isherwood decides to leave Berlin after hearing a version of Horst Wessel being sung. Finally, surveying the hate-filled eyes I was also reminded of Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935).

    I would argue that a similar species of Irish hatred is more vicious but far less powerful in electoral terms, bu there is now a real danger of the extreme right winning power in the U.K..

    Dozens of police officers were injured at the protests, yet only twenty-five arrests were made.  The counter demonstrators, understandably smaller in number, were non-violent, and let us be clear that a right to protest is intrinsic to democracy. Peaceful protest that is, an idea as old as Gandhi or Martin Luther King. Yet there were 500 arrests made at the peaceful Gaza protests in early October.

    This casts the right to protest into doubt, or at the very least demonstrates a need for greater regulation and proportionality. The insurrectionist riots and arson attacks on accommodation related to asylum seekers in Ireland in recent times is also a case in point, demonstrating the necessity of regulating (violent) protest.

    The Just Oil protesters, with others to come, were convicted under the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (PCA) of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance, in response to the M25 motorway disruption in November 2022. Judge Hehir dismissed the defence of mere political opinion and belief as excluded from the present English legislation.

    That decision undoubtedly opens a dangerous vista, but the crucial question is that of whether a demonstration potentially causes harm, and that one clearly could have caused harm, and it certainly caused a significant furore and inconvenience.

    “Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds.”

    Orange lily

    In the famous common law prosecution orange lily case Humphries v O’ Connor (1864) plucking an orange order lily from a woman in the nationalist area of Belfast was deemed a justifiable police act and regulation of protest, as the offending lily had the potential to cause a breach of the peace. This occurs when an individual causes harm, or if it is likely that they will cause harm to another individual or property, or if it puts another person in fear of being harmed.

    As Shakespeare put it in Sonnet 94:

    For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds;
    Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds.

    But what harm or public nuisance has Banksy caused? He has frankly adorned RCJ with better artwork outside than there is inside. Is it really an incitement to protest in contravention of the law or a protest to survive?

    Ronald Dworkin, towards the end of his career, wrote an article on the Right to Ridicule peculiarly appropriate to Banksy. There are, for sure, limits, such as Enoch Burke silently or not so silently protesting outside his school. He is not an artist and most decidedly frankly a nuisance, disturbing children being educated. So perhaps certain forms of protest should be consigned to Mountjoy. But there are also demonstrators from Stop Oil, Gaza Extinction Rebellion residing, perhaps excessively, in custody in the U.K.. Now, perhaps a great artist in will be in there next. But that mural was created before 150,000 people turned up in central London.

    The great political artist of our time, a private and ostensibly decent man, should not be publicly prosecuted for making legitimate points of criticism, with a drawing that Goya Picasso, Schiele or indeed Hergé would have been proud of. Hergé’s TIN TIN books were about the Manichean divide between good and evil. So who is the demon today, the contemporary Captain Haddock?

    Banksy deserves an anonymous knighthood not public humiliation. He should be known by his self-designation and not outed by a magistrate’s court.

    Whether he should pay a fine for profiting commercially from the mural is a different question. After all, would he not approve of charges being pressed against the fascist mob that attacked the police?  Perhaps any proceeds should go to police wellness programmes?

    In the film Cabaret the Isherwood character says: “do you really think you can control them?” Well, Banksy do you? And are you encouraging them or inciting the mob, the robbing room sagely discussed.

    It is crucial to realize that the Populist alt-right and indeed at times the extreme left have served to reduce speech and protest rights in an increasingly vigilante age, and now use protest to destroy democracy. So be careful about admonitions of judicial crackdowns even through art. For many are using democracy to destroy the social democratic consensus. And fringe leftist protests such as Just Oil are not much better.

    So, the legal arguments about disproportionately cracking down on violent or even peaceful protests certainly are no longer as clear-cut as the mural might suggest.

    In the robing room the venerable member concluded that perhaps an arbitral solution might involve a private settlement, i.e. a charitable gift. But none of that settles the regulation of the right to protest, which is now increasingly fragile.


    Feature Image: Banksy mural, 8 September 2025.

  • Socio-Economic Rights Must Be Vindicated

    The noted American historian, and Putin critic,Timothy Snyder’s recent text Our Malady: Lessons in Liberty and Solidarity (2020) is a cri de coeur against almost non-existent healthcare rights in the U.S. – which the pandemic brought into sharp focus. The cossetted Yale professor saw the light, as his country failed to cope.

    Our Malady is about health care, but it is also an example of confessional literature about how health care provision, or lack thereof, begins to affect even those that are putatively privileged. The pandemic laid bare the limitations of the neoliberal order. But it is not just about healthcare, and not just about the United States, as the pandemic lays waste to income structure, life expectancies and perhaps a whole species’ expectations of the good life.

    We urgently require legal arguments in terms of justiciability, resource allocation and clarification of the limits and extent of judicial powers to enforce social and economic rights.  These arguments are no longer of cautious relevance given the gathering storm we confront. This is not the time for legal casuistry, or politeness either.

    https://vimeo.com/426871719

    In terms of the consensus as to what these rights are let me sketch a list, all of which are denuded or under threat:

    1. A right to adequate nutrition.
    2. A right to clean drinking water, and for bathing.
    3. A right to basic health care and, in particular, to emergency treatment.
    4. A right to housing or shelter; alongside a complimentary right to resist arbitrary eviction.
    5. A right to a minimum or adequate standard of living.
    6. A right to social security, leading to universal basic income.
    7. A right to a healthy environment, including air quality.
    8. A right to education, up to third level.
    9. A generalised right to dignity and self-expression in terms of expressing one’s identity.
    10. A right of a country to development.

    Crucially, there is a lively discussion as to which of such rights must be progressively realised, and which have a minimum content that are immediately realisable. Thus, the right to health care, both domestically and internationally, is progressively realisable, subject to resources.

    A right to emergency health care, however, is a minimum content right with direct enforceability, if justiciable.

    Similarly, the right to shelter is progressively realisable, but the international consensus is that forced or arbitrary evictions are directly enforceable again, if justiciable.

    Social and economic rights, in fact, have a long intellectual pedigree. Indeed, they are even evident in Thomas Hobbes’s enumeration of Natural Rights. Ancient Greek philosophers also identified such fundamental natural rights as inherent to membership of a polity.

    Eleanor Roosevelt with the UN Universal Declaraion of Human Rights.

    The proposal to include them in the UN Charter was aborted by representatives of the developed world. They were reconstituted in the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but with limited effectiveness, even allowing for recent rights of individual petition. Now amidst a growing convergence between developed and developing societies in the neoliberal order, we are increasingly all in the same boat.

    Right to Life

    The Indian Supreme Court decision in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation concerned public interest litigation by thousands of pavement dwellers of Bombay city.

    The plaintiffs argued that they could not be evicted from their squalid shelters without being offered alternative accommodation. They further argued that they had chosen a pavement or slum to live because it was nearest to their place of work, and that evicting them would result in deprivation of a right to a livelihood.

    The petitioners were to be evicted under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, which empowered the Municipal Commissioner to remove encroachments on footpaths or pavements over which the public have a right of passage or access.

    Olga Tellis, Ex Editor of Sunday Observer & Asian Age. Source YouTube.

    The relevant article of the Indian Constitution (modelled on Article 45 of the Irish Constitution) excludes the Directive Principles from judicial cognisance, yet the court opined, in finding that the right to life itself was informed by the Directive Principles; that Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which is a Directive Principle of State Policy, provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards ensuring that citizens have the right to an adequate means of livelihood.

    The court concluded that if there is an obligation upon the State to ensure citizens enjoys an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be an exercise in pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life.

    The judgement thus expanded the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution to include within its scope the right to livelihood, which in this context translated into the right to be allowed to remain on the pavements.

    More remarkably in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & OR’s (2003), India’s Supreme Court derived the right to food from the right to life and ordered that that the Famine Code permitting the release of grain stocks in times of famine be implemented.

    The court ordered that the grain allocation for the food to work scheme be doubled and financial support for schemes be increased; that ration shop licensees stay open and provide the grain to families below the poverty line at a set price; that publicity be given to the rights of families below the poverty line to grain; that all individuals without means of support (for example older persons, widows, disabled adults) be granted an Anthodia Anna Yojana ration card for free grain; and that State governments should progressively implement the mid-day meal scheme in schools.

    In terms of stretching the bounds of acceptable judicial intervention this case could not be more dramatic, as the Court utilised mandatory policing orders and even inspectors in the field to ensure compliance with their orders, which have spread nationwide.

    With inflation in food prices already evident in the wake of the pandemic, will our judicial authorities oblige often reluctant, and even compromised, executive authorities to intervene in the market, and avert shortages? And in Ireland will the Court overcome a reluctance to vindicate a right to housing as part of a generalised right to life?

    Canadian Dissenting Opinion

    In Canada a similar conclusion that social and economic rights inform the content of the right to life is evident in a dissenting opinion in the Canadian Supreme Court case of Gosselin v. Attorney General of Quebec (2004).

    The case concerned the denial of unemployment assistance to those under thirty-five, who could do a form of workfare in lieu. The court addressed issues pertaining to discrimination and the right to life and security of the person under the Canadian charter. The majority found the law justifiable and in Thatcherite terms as an incentive for the young to work. “Get on your bike”, as Norman Tebbit would put it.

    Judge Louise Arbour dissented however, as indeed did Mr Justice Lahreux Herbe. Arbour J. derived a right to minimum social assistance from the right to life and indeed security of the person under Section 7 of the Charter, and drew a prudential distinction between corporate-commercial economic rights and economic rights fundamental to health and human survival.

    He indicated that the appeal makes it obvious why ‘those economic rights fundamentals to human life or survival’ should not be treated as akin to corporate commercial economic rights.

    Simply put, the rights at issue here are so intimately intertwined with one’s basic health (and hence ‘security of the person’) – and, at the limit, even of one’s survival (and hence ‘life’) — they could readily be accommodated under section 7 rights of ‘life, liberty and security of the person’, without the need to constitutionalize ‘property’ rights or interests.

    Notably, Arbour J also links the right to health to the guarantee of security of the person. He argued the expansion of the right to life in this fashion gave content to this right, which is to be protected in such a fashion so as to invest the State with a positive duty to protect life.

    Little shop on the main street of Dukathole, South Africa.

    South African Experience

    It might be noted that the South African experience is different in that social and economic rights are textual and thus inherently justiciable, with the word dignity mentioned in several places.

    The relevant housing provision explored in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (2000) is Article 26 whereby:

    Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.

    The South African Constitution also specifies an immediately enforceable specific minimum right against forced or arbitrary evictions. Such a right entails:

    1. Meaningful consultation prior to eviction.
    2. Alternative relocation if eviction proceeds.
    3. No eviction to proceed unless the land is being put to productive use.

    Nonetheless, the South African Courts have set down limits for their review and in general such rights are in the text of the document to be progressively realised.

    In Subramani v. Minister for Health (1997) for example the South African Supreme Court was very explicit about the large margin of discretion it would give to the State to set its budget.

    It also states that the court: ‘will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities.’

    Sachs J went further stating that:

    In open and democratic societies based upon dignity, freedom and equality, the rationing of access to life-prolonging resources is regarded as integral to, rather than incompatible with, a human rights approach to health care.

    However, if decisions taken are deemed unreasonable then the South African courts will step in. Thus, in the Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2002) and in Azbuka and Others v City of Johannesburg (2009) the extent of the right to water was litigated in South Africa after the case arose in Soweto.

    Justice Oregon writing for the Constitutional court found the City’s free basic water policy of twenty-five litres per person per day to be reasonable under section 27(1) of the Constitution, and that the introduction of prepaid water meters to be lawful, procedurally fair, and not unfairly discriminatory.

    The Court noted that the City was under no constitutional duty to provide any amount of free water, but merely to take reasonable measures to progressively realise that right. It said it could not fix a minimum core amount, as this would vary in terms of personal and local circumstances and would prevent context being considered.

    It also argued that this was not a determination for a court to make, as it was properly the role of the democratic branches of government to investigate conditions, having regard to the availability of resources, and to determine achievable targets.

    Irish Housing

    In Ireland, the housing market is chronically under-supplied with affordable units, particularly in Dublin, but increasingly elsewhere too. Many local councils appear reluctant to countenance building modular homes, and the rental market is out of control and extortionate.

    David McWilliams blithely advises homeowners to step away from the market, as there is no security for the mortgaged or rentier class, but for most finding a home to live in is not an investment.

    The Irish State is also tolerating rampant evictions by banks and Vulture Funds and negligently permitting unfair commercial practices to occur, often in breach of consumer protection.

    Thus, lenders have reneged on agreements bartered with consumers at a time of high ostensible economic prosperity by neglecting a contractual obligation to revert the consumer to a tracker mortgage after the expiry of a fixed rate period, or upping interest rates to the highest in the Eurozone, often aimed at those seeking to exit the country.

    Thus, lending institutions with no interest in Ireland such as Danske Bank and The Bank of Scotland simply left the room and disposed of their assets, hiking up the mortgage interest rate payments as they left and/or selling assets off to Vulture Funds.

    Ulster Bank has followed them out the door, while citizens are thrown out on the streets in spite of the pandemic.

    The old cry of the tenant farmer for the 3Fs: Fixity of Tenure; Free Sale and a Fair Rent falls on deaf ears in the era of the Vultures.

    The Sinnott Case

    In the Sinnott case (2001), comprising judgments from all seven members, the Supreme Court was asked inter alia to adjudicate on the legality of mandatory orders made in the High Court by Judge Peter Kelly. This precedent remains an important brake on the capacity of the Court to vindicate the right to life – which includes a right to shelter – of Irish citizens.

    In a leading judgment for the majority Adrian Hardiman, following a High Court decision of Justice Declan Costello in O’Reilly v Limerick UDC (1989) distinguished between commutative and distributive justice, the former bearing on relations between individuals such as found in contract and tort, with the latter involving the distribution of the resources of the State.

    In contrast to commutative justice which Hardiman considered central to the Court’s function, he held that the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over distributive justice was repugnant to the Separation of Powers.

    Despite Justice Costello demonstrating a willingness to countenance distributive justice in the subsequent case of O’Brien v Wicklow District Council (1994) Hardiman only brought to bear his arguments in O’Reilly, and sought to elevate non-justiciability to a constitutional principle.

    He said that the apportionment of resources ‘would lead the Courts into the taking of decisions in areas in which they have no special qualification or experience’; and were a judge to engage in ‘designing the details of policy in individual cases or in general, and ranking some areas of policy in priority to others, they would step beyond their appointed role.’ He did, however, allude to generalised ‘human rights to earn a livelihood and hold property.’

    It would appear to have been disingenuous for Hardiman to deny jurisdiction on the grounds of judicial incompetence in budgetary affairs. Detailed financial resolutions are, after all, already executed in the commercial arena. The test is one of proportionality, as the South African case law demonstrates.

    A paramount right to life under Article 40.3 should now require the Court to make mandatory orders, interceding on behalf of citizens whose health and life is threatened by this Housing Crisis, particularly in the presence of contagious disease. Where the executive and legislature fail to vindicate a right to life the Court must surely assume responsibility.

    The Harp needs more than tuning…

    A Constitutional Challenge

    To deal with homelessness and affordable housing a challenge needs to be made through the courts to establish a right to housing.

    The Irish Constitution through Article 45 and a generalised right to life contains minimum rights against forced or arbitrary evictions.

    Such a right should lead inter alia: to meaningful consultation begin given prior to any eviction; alternative relocation if eviction proceeds; no eviction proceeding unless the land is being put to productive use.

    An arbitrator should also be able to probe into what banks or Vulture Fund intend to do with this vital infrastructure, fundamental to the lives and livelihoods of citizens.

    Any arbitrator would of course reject spurious defences involving colossal amounts of borrowings, but should achieve a re-calibration of the system. establishing some equality of arms in the process, now desperately needed.

    Shelter from the Storm

    Without adequate shelter no one can live a dignified existence. A home – a place of one’s own – is intrinsic to the good life we have a right to expect. But housing is only one issue.

    Our social structure is unravelling through the hidden hand of American and Canadian Vulture and Cuckoo Funds. In the dystopian aftermath of the Pandemic, and Screen New Deal, once vibrant communities are fracturing, and social atomization is increasing apace.

    In the urban wastelands, we have entered the territory of Chile under Pinochet during the 1970s as Ireland becomes a test case for how much a people can endure.

    Salvador Allende in 1972.

    In her recent novel A Long Petal in the Sea (2019), Chilean novelist Isabel Allende – a distant cousin of the murdered President Salvador Allende – describes the scene in Chile at the time, bearing increasing resemblance to our increasingly dysfunctional society:

    He called to tell them that on the surface the country was modern and prosperous, but one only had to dig down a little to see the damage underneath. The degree of inequality was staggering: three-quarters of the wealth was in the hands of twenty families. The middle class survived on credit; there was poverty for the many and opulence for the few; shantytowns contrasting with glass skyscrapers and mansions behind walls. Wellbeing and security for some; unemployment and repression for others. The economic miracle of recent times, based on absolute freedom for capital and a lack of basic rights for workers, had burst like a bubble.

    Similarly:

    The military government had decided public services should be in private hands. Health was not a right, but a consumer good to be bought and sold. In those years when everything that everything had been privatized had been, from electricity to airlines, a plethora of private clinics had sprung, with state-of-the art buildings and facilities for those who could afford them.

    One thinks of The Beacon Hospital and other facilities reserved for Ireland’s wealthy health consumers.

    Life depends on livelihoods, now threatened by disproportionate measures. There must be an alternative. Otherwise, suicide, shortened lives, poverty, inequality, social exclusion, and social fragmentation await, leading to fascism and extremism. In this respect, COVID-19 has been the perfect storm of opportunism, or a coalition of interests.

  • Unenumerated Constitutional Rights Erode Irish Democracy

    John Philpot Curran

    When the Federal Convention of 1878 had completed its work on the U.S. Constitution in Philadelphia, Benjamin Franklin described its result as, “A Republic, Madam, if you can keep it”.

    Not much later, John Philpot Curran gave a similar warning, now usually summarised as “Vigilance is the price of liberty”.

    Each was saying that a written Constitution describes how a country should be governed, but does not promise that it will be. If we want to keep the system we have chosen, we must be vigilant. A single departure may not seem very significant, but if we ignore it we may realise too late that it was a step in undermining our system of government. It is not enough for political leaders to be alert. In a democracy we are all political leaders, our system of government and the freedoms it promises belong to us, and if we want to keep them we must be vigilant to protect them.

    This country has a democratic Constitution. Article 5 declares that it is to be a democratic state, and other Articles, read together, deliver on that promise. The Dáil is to be the dominant power in the Oireachtas.  Elections for it must be held at regular intervals, so that we can dismiss political leaders who do not serve us as we wish.  Elections must be by single transferable vote.  The “sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State” is vested in the Oireachtas, the only limit being that its laws may not be “repugnant to the Constitution”.  Laws are made in public, at sittings the public can attend and the media can report.

    That our only lawmakers are those the People choose is the foundation of our democracy, as of every representative democracy. By adopting a Constitution that said that the only people who could shape the country by making law were those we had elected, we gave ourselves a democracy in 1937 – if we could keep it.

    Leinster House the meeting place of Dáil Eireann.

    Have we? Partly seems to be the best answer. The Oireachtas is no longer our sole and exclusive lawmaker. In the 1960s Irish judges began to adopt what is called “judicial activism”, the view that judges should play an active role in shaping the law.  In 1965 the High Court advanced that view in the Gladys Ryan case. The Oireachtas had decided that it would be good for our dental health if piped drinking water contained a tiny proportion of fluoride, and enacted the Health (Fluoridation of Water Supplies) Act, 1960, under which piped drinking water was and is fluoridated. Mrs Ryan complained that this meant she and her children had to drink contaminated water, and took High Court proceedings to have the Act annulled. After a hearing lasting many months Judge John Kenny decided she had not proved that fluoridated water was injurious to health and dismissed her claim.  But he made it clear that if he had formed a different view he would have annulled the Act.

    That the case went to hearing is surprising. As we noted above, our Constitution vests in the Oireachtas the “sole and exclusive power of making law for the State”. Those words seem to mean that if a citizen thought an Act was defective her only resource would be to campaign to have the Oireachtas repeal or amend it. If another authority within the State could examine the reasons that led the Oireachtas to pass the law, disagree with them and annul the legislation, the power of the Oireachtas to make law would not be “sole and exclusive”. Those words seem to mean that the judge should not have heard the claim, because he had no authority to interfere with legislation that was consistent with the text of the Constitution. The Attorney General seems not to have made that argument. If so, he effectively abandoned the Constitutional authority of the Oireachtas as our sole and exclusive lawmaker.  It seems never since to have been asserted in any Court.

    The Judgment was a blow to the authority of the Oireachtas in another way. The effect of Judge Kenny’s decision was: “The Constitution includes a list of rights it guarantees to citizens, and the list is clearly not intended to be complete. Other rights may be added. The Oireachtas can add them. So can judges. A judge of the High Court or Supreme Court may decide to recognise a right that a citizen claims but the Constitution does not mention and deem that right to be part of the Constitution, as though it had been included in the document the People adopted in 1937. An Act of the Oireachtas or a Section of an Act that is incompatible with a right a judge has decided to recognise will be annulled as if it were repugnant to the Constitution, even though it is not”. (Rights so identified later came to be called “unenumerated rights, and we will use that term, for simplicity.)

    The Ryan decision changed how we are governed, in three ways. First, judges could examine why the Oireachtas had passed legislation and interfere if they disagreed with its reasons.  Secondly, the Oireachtas’ authority to make laws was no longer sole and exclusive, because judges might decide to recognise and enforce an “unenumerated right”. Thirdly, such a decision by a judge would override legislation enacted by the Oireachtas. That may seem to be a transfer of power from one organ of State to another, but it was an erosion of our democracy, because representative democracy depends on laws being made by those we have elected and by nobody else. Authorising people we had not elected and could not get rid of to override decisions of those we had elected was and is inconsistent with our claim to be a democratic state.

    The Ryan decision also undermined our authority in a less obvious way. Our Constitution provides that only we, the People, may amend it, but when judges import “unenumerated rights” into it they in effect amend it. Our authority to do so is no longer sole and exclusive.

    Separation of Powers.

    Finally, it effectively changes the meaning of “separation of powers” and “separation of functions”. These used to mean that each of the three organs of government, the legislative, executive and judicial, had its separate function in which neither of the others should interfere. It now seems to mean only that the legislature and executive may not interfere in the judicial function.

    There was no protest. We did not show vigilance in defence of our freedom.

    Judges have invoked the “doctrine of unenumerated rights” (a “doctrine” is more impressive than a “theory”) many times since 1965. Unlike legislators, judges deal only with issues others bring before them, so they produce new “doctrines” or “rights” only if litigation gives them the opportunity. However, a substantial number of unenumerated rights have been established and a substantial amount of legislation annulled in the last thirty-six years. For example:

    • Although all of the rights the Constitution lists except Habeas Corpus are promised only to citizens, that is only to people who, as it says, owe loyalty to the Nation and fidelity to the State, the Supreme Court decided to grant an “unenumerated right” to a non-citizen. (V.H. v. Minister for Justice Supreme Court No 31 & 56/2016)
    • It forbade the Government to participate in a referendum campaign. (McKenna An Taoiseach & ors IESC 11; [1995] 2 IR 10.)
    • It forbade the Dáil to conduct an inquiry into matters of public concern that might call for legislative intervention. (Maguire and others Seán Ardagh and others [2001] No. 329 JR; S.C. Nos. 324, 326, 333 and 334 of 2001] – the “Abbeylara case”.)
    • On dubious grounds it invalidated legislation designed to protect young girls from sexual exploitation. C. v. Ireland & ors [2006] IESC 33
    • It refused to hear a Habeas Corpus claim by a citizen who claimed to be unlawfully imprisoned, although the Constitution promises that right to anyone to making such a claim. (Edward Ryan v. Governor of Midland Prison [2014] IEHC 338)
    • In a puzzling decision, it held that a police officer who is asked to approve a search warrant must act “judicially”, and that an officer involved in the relevant investigation cannot do so. The essence of us acting judicially is hearing both sides before reaching a conclusion.  That does not seem to be what the Court meant, but it did not explain what it did mean. (Damache V. DPP {2012] IESC 11
    • Although tradition and the Constitution both say that elected legislators in the Dáil or Seanad are to be free to perform their duties without judicial oversight, the Supreme Court decided that someone who claimed to have been injured by what had been said to her in a Dáil committee could pursue a claim. Kerins v. McGuinness & Ors.  [2019]  IESC 110
    • One Supreme Court judge, Judge O’Donnell, complained in a written Judgment of the quality of legislation, in language reminiscent of an irritated employer complaining about incompetent subordinates. (Clarke  O’Gorman [2014] IESC 72)

    Each of these decisions further undermined the Oireachtas, and, through the Oireachtas, the Irish People’s power to shape the country we live in. Two of them, N.V.H.  and Edward Ryan, are incompatible with the text of the Constitution. The list shows how much of our lives, which we agreed in 1937 should be governed by our elected legislators are now subject to the Court’s intervention – or interference. Again we have not shown vigilance.

    Nor did those we elected to represent us. On the contrary, they have recently enacted the Judicial Council Act, which, after bringing the Council into existence, invited it to prepare “Guidelines” for compensation to be paid to successful plaintiffs in personal injury claims.

    Superficially, that may have seemed rational. Individual judges decide what money should be paid as compensation for injury, so why should not judges as a group agree Guidelines to be applied, or at least consulted, in all cases? The answer is simple. Deciding what compensation should be paid to an injured plaintiff is administering justice, which is the role of judges.  Guidelines to be consulted in all cases have the effect of law, even if they are given another name. Judges have no role in making law. Only the Oireachtas has. So in passing the Act the Oireachtas declined to perform a function that the Constitution imposes on it, and delegated it to a body that has no authority to perform it. This also meant that questions that elected parliamentarians should have teased out will not get the attention they need.  Here are some examples. Readers may think of others.

    • Personal injuries actions operate on an assumption that pain, past present and prospective, can be compensated for by money, and only by money. Is that assumption valid?
    • If it is, is it right to assume that the extent of the pain, not the circumstances of the sufferer, determines the amount of compensation? €10,000 might seem a life-saver for a young couple struggling with high rent or mortgage and household bills, but be next to useless to a retired person living on an adequate pension.
    • Our system protects a wrong-doer from having to address and acknowledge the consequences of his or her wrong-doing, because insurance companies forbid any contact between their insured and his or her victim. Does that serve us well?  Would we drive more carefully if we knew we would have to confront personally the consequences of any carelessness? 

      The criminal court of justice, Dublin. Daniele Idini/Cassandra Voices

    Most Superior Court judges nowadays are “Judicial activists” as described above. The concept is obviously attractive to judges and perhaps to others who believe trained intellects shape a society better than “ordinary people” could. But it is incompatible with democracy. That the Oireachtas invited a Council of judges to make law and the judges agreed tells us how far this country has travelled from the democratic ideals set out in our Constitution. Incidentally, the Guidelines emerged only after judges had circulated among themselves documents that they discussed in private, and that we did not get to see. With limited exceptions, our Constitution requires the Oireachtas and the judges to do their work in public, but, understandably, it did not consider how judges should do the work of the Oireachtas.

    This article is critical of judicial decisions, and might seem to be hostile to our judiciary. Not so. Most of our judges are admirable men and women, with a deep understanding of the law and a strong commitment to justice. The purpose of each decision mentioned above (except the refusal of Habeas Corpus, which still seems incomprehensible) was to do justice. For a dedicated judge to deny someone justice, because our legal structure does not permit it must be disagreeable, almost like a physician refusing treatment to someone who needs it. Most judicial decisions were well motivated and most were beneficial to the community.

    So, the argument that our precious democracy has been and is being eroded by decisions of judges does not mean we should denounce them. It would be wiser to suggest to them, politely, that our country would be better served if they respected the authority of our legislature more than they do at present, recognising that even a little judicial activism risks putting the judiciary in competition with the legislature and that carried to extremes it is inconsistent with democracy. If judges came to accept that, we can be sure they would act to address the problem. They are used to examining and evaluating evidence and arguments, and if the arguments stand up and are supported by the evidence, we should expect our judges to accept them, consider what they need to do to remedy the situation, and do it.  If they accept that an imbalance has grown up between our organs of government that threatens our democracy, we can be confident that change will follow.

    But if they do not, we should remember what Franklin and Curran taught us.