Cassandra Voices

Tag: Special Criminal Court

  • Facilitating the Dirty Business of the State

    Both as a lawyer and Supreme Court judge, Louis Brandeis was an inveterate opponent of big business interests. Less well known than his other contributions, is that he a co-authored a text in the 1890 Harvard Law Review that invented a privacy right, which has steadily been eroded in criminal justice.

    Indeed, as a judge in Olmstead v US Brandeis extended the privacy right to what he termed ‘the dirty business of the state’. In that case, without judicial approval, federal agents had installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead’s office and in the streets near his home.

    Culminating in the recent Quirke case, in Ireland, a right to privacy in criminal proceedings has now reached a juncture of virtual nonexistence.

    In my last article I referred to Irish Supreme Court Justice Gerard Hogan’s opinion that for thirty years the Irish Courts have failed to enforce due process under Article 38 of the Irish Constitution. The Quirke case delivers us to the terminus, facilitating the dirty business of the state.

    In that case, evidence gleaned from a computer unlawfully seized from Patrick Quirke’s home was deemed admissible. Jurors in Quirke’s original trial were informed that Quirke’s computer was used for internet searches on the decomposition of human remains and limitations of forensic DNA. Quirke was found guilty of murder based on circumstantial evidence.

    Louis Brandeis 1856-1941.

    No Statutory Safeguards

    In Ireland we now enjoy no statutory safeguards, other than Judges’ Rules, whereas in the U.K. Section 76 and Section 78 of PACE (The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984) are actively enforced to exclude coercive and inappropriate tricks or force, and that which impacts on the fairness of the proceedings. I know from experience that judges in the U.K. are vigilant at throwing out a case in the event of an abuse of process.

    The murmurings by the Irish government about the implementation of the Special Criminal Court recommendations is a space which should be carefully watched. Most likely, in my view, is that an institutional preference for non-jury courts will be given ever-wider jurisdiction.

    It is a sign of how we are entering an inquisitorial rather than adversarial age worldwide, not just in Ireland, which suits the interests of many of our elites. Our own, and other states, are sidestepping the Rule of Law in the interests of big business, often at the expense of the sometimes-innocent lives of others.

    Furthermore, it is noticeable that the seven judges of the Supreme Court selected to adjudicate on the Quirke case did not include the state’s leading constitutional lawyer. Gerard Hogan’s absence was his presence.

    One can only wonder why Hogan was, deliberately or otherwise, excluded. Perhaps to preserve a show of strength through unanimity? Or maybe Hogan would rather colleagues were unanimously wrong, and wanted no hand nor part in it.

    While on the High Court Peter Charleton was the architect of the nefarious JC case. His judgment in Quirke expressly reinforces that case, and fails to over-rule it as doctrinally unsound. He also sidesteps accepted breaches of EU and ECHR data protection under the privacy right. The judgment effectively subsumes a right to privacy at the expense of public order considerations, and legitimates the dirty business of the state.

    The Supreme Court could have engaged in a process of reconsideration and followed the late Adrian Hardiman’s masterful dissenting judgment in JC. They had a choice and did not.

    Hardiman’s absence is also his presence. The shade of a forgotten ancestor. His dissent is not even addressed in any satisfactory detail in Quirke. This failure to address Hardiman’s reasoning is not dissimilar to the way the State treats whistleblowers, who are demonised, ignored, trivialised or excluded. If all else fails, as in the McCabe inquiry which Charlton presided over, the State endeavours to deflect, invoking the shabby excuse of inadvertence – at least until confronted by the stark truth.

    Then, only after being caught with your legal pants down, do you cobble together a shabby deal involving a multimillion pound pay out. With a confidentiality agreement of course.

    Image: Daniele Idini

    Factual Matrix

    The factual matrix of Quirke may go some way towards suggesting that it was an inadvertent mistake, but that is not a typical pattern, as various sources, including the Morris Tribunal, and Hardiman’s eviscerating judgment in JC, demonstrate that discipline – and it might be said ethics –  are barely apparent in the Irish police force: An Garda Síochana.

    It is not a case of – as I can testify – simply of incompetence, though this is undoubtedly part of the problem. It is a combination of tunnel vision, or cognitive bias, coupled with active attempts to frame those deemed to be threats, or perceived threats.

    Whistleblowers, including and especially internal ones, are a particular target, but human rights lawyers or defence counsels may also be in their line of fire.

    There is no point having the symmetrical precision contained in Charleton’s detailed judgment and in some of the majority judgments in the JC case. This is not a case about shipping or guarantees where rules can be implemented precisely with clear consequences; and where high commercial stakes demand clarity and precision, which can then be cross-checked against best practice in industry.

    The rules in criminal proceedings must be matched up with, and adapted to, social realities. A member of An Garda Síochana may describe something as inadvertence when it was a reckless or deliberate violation of constitutional rights. There is a consistent tendency to lie or cover up. That is what the Morris Tribunal and other reports demonstrate. Things have got worse not better. This was not dealt with adequately in the Report of the Fennelly Commission.

    Image: Daniele Idini.

    The Path of The Law

    In one of his most celebrated contributions to legal discourse Brandeis created the so-called Brandeis Brief, which is often used in cases involving the death penalty, and others. This involves the marshalling of economic and sociological data, historical experience, and expert opinions to support legal propositions, i.e. judgments must be cross-checked against social realities.

    Therefore, in Ireland the behaviour of the police does not warrant a watering down of the strict exclusionary rule. In Ireland we require a high standard. Discretionary rules will not be applied.

    If the police are afforded the excuse of inadvertence, they will happily paper over illegality.

    Rules must be informed by social realities. It was recently alleged in the High Court that a number of officers supervised the importation of drugs, and controlled the flow of shipments to dealers. Woe betide anyone who has the temerity to stand in their way.

    Charleton by implication, and expressly, suggests that a factual inquiry into the bona fides or honesty of a police action and decision can be made in a specific context. But given the present Special Criminal Court dispensation, accepting uncorroborated police evidence, that inquiry must be very limited and conditioned by the judgement of subjective officialdom.

    The acceptance of a Garda evidence in even securing a warrant without adversarial scrutiny is unacceptable. Safeguards need to be built into the system.

    The Quirke judgment is a travesty: a neatly-ordered, precise and tidy travesty – as is Charleton’s want. We should not be facilitating the dirty business of the state but enforcing the privacy right.

    Feature Image: Daniele Idini

  • Disturbing Developments in Criminal Justice in Ireland

    All persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by, and entitled to, the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts.
    Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law‘, Sir David Williams Lecture, Cambridge, 2006.

    I have written extensively about the whittling away of due process in Ireland. This is derived from Article 38 of the Constitution, which states: No person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law.

    In 2017 Supreme Court Justice Gerard Hogan at least had the courage to argue that the Irish Courts have, in effect, failed to enforce due process, constitutional rights in Ireland for the past thirty years. ‘Moves’, he said, to reduce the scope of ‘the most fundamental constitutional safeguard of all‘ — the habeas corpus guarantee in Article 40.4.2 – ‘speaks volumes regarding the prevailing constitutional zeitgeist.’ That zeitgeist has only become more illiberal, especially with the advent of emergency powers in response to Covid-19.

    Indeed, we have no equivalent to the UK’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 giving statutory protection to anyone suspected of a crime.

    The particular violations of due process have been exposed in the J.C. Case (2015) where the Supreme Court – notwithstanding what was probably Adrian Hardiman’s most brilliant dissenting judgment – effectively allowed the police to characterise as an accident, what seems to have been a purposeful and deliberate breach of constitutional rights.

    We have also witnessed the subordination of privacy rights to considerations of public order in the Dwyer Case on appeal to the Supreme Court. There, the Court simply sidestepped the State’s breaches of directly applicable EU data protection legislation, rendering privacy rights a dead duck.

    But if these developments aren’t sinister enough, consider what is happening now for the liberty of the subject.

    Adrian Hardiman.

    In Camera Proceedings

    The term in camera in legal and juridical terms is about a hearing being held in private. It is a pragmatic feature of civil or industrial processes, such as patent violations or family law proceedings. It has various implications, including that the names and identities of the parties to the suit are kept out of the public gaze, and reporting restrictions are in place, including press coverage and conventional law reporting. A judgment could be published, and context made clear, but details may be kept out, redacted or anonymised.

    The intra-jurisdictional consensus – a fundamental principle of international law – is that when a process or a piece of legislation or an executive decree is adjudicated without there being independent representation or scrutiny it is of dubious authority, as it has not been adequately challenged.

    In camera proceedings can be a shortcut to secretive laws, which were even condemned by the Nazi jurist Carl Schmidt. Schmidt’s view is echoed in the minority report on the future of the Special Criminal Court.

    So-called emergency powers have a nasty habit of becoming permanent, everywhere. In the face of opposition, however, the UK government repealed its controversial law, giving police the right to apprehend people suspected (hence ‘sus’) of ‘intent to commit an arrestable offence.’

    Within Lord Bingham’s summary of the Rule of Law is the idea that the law ‘should be publicly administered in the courts.’ It is crucial for any democracy that all judgments become a matter of public record or, failing that, only partial elements are excluded, and then only by implication, after independent representations of counsel.

    This is violated when in camera proceedings occur. Justice, as Bingham said, cannot be achieved behind closed doors.

    The current Minister for Justice Helen McEntee TD has, nonetheless, obtained a High Court order from Justice Owens requiring telecommunications service providers to retain certain data – including user, traffic and location data – for a period of twelve months, for the purpose of safeguarding the security of the State.

    The Communications (Retention of Data) (Amendment) Act 2022 came into operation on June 26, 2023. Under the terms of the Act, the Minister for Justice must have been satisfied that there exists a serious and genuine, present or foreseeable, threat to the security of the State.

    She also, presumably, had regard to the necessity and proportionality of the retention of Schedule 2 data, and how this could potentially impact on the fundamental rights of citizens under the Constitution. Justice Owens was obviously persuaded by her arguments, which are not in the public domain, for reasons of state security; do you see where this is going?

    It should also be noted that the Minister consulted with the Garda Commissioner prior to making the application. The Act was, in effect, a transposition of an EU Directive, but no scrutiny has been permitted. No independent counsel. No counterweight.

    So what could this threat to the security of the state amount to? Minister McEntee also recently stated that Sinn Féin presents a threat to the criminal justice system because they timorously suggested adopting suggestions of the review group on the Special Criminal Court.

    The Yam Case of 2020, which Geoffrey Robertson QC litigated before the ECHR under Article 6, clearly identified that even partial exclusion under the in camera rule and partial reportage invites scrutiny.

    Thus, T.J. McIntyre from the Sutherland School of Law in UCD argued that Ireland’s new mass surveillance regime is ‘certain’ to be challenged in the European courts. He said the government’s decision to seek a High Court order was made ‘behind closed doors, without any consultation with the data protection commissioner, with civil society, or with the industry’ and, importantly with no detail provided on the supposed national security threat.

    In a damning assessment he stated:

    The 2022 Act has to be treated as of no legal value … You can’t have a measure that’s supposed to authorise mass surveillance of the entire population, and be the basis for criminal investigations and prosecutions for years to come, where its foundation is so uncertain. It’s grossly irresponsible to do that.

    Thomas Bingham, Baron Bingham of Cornhill 1933-2010.

    Special Justice

    The Special Criminal Court is a three-judge criminal court, convened without a jury to avoid any potential intimidation of its members. It is enabled by the Offences Against the State Act, the first of which was published in 1939 to prosecute members of the IRA and declare any similar organisations unlawful. More recently, the Court has been used to deal with the deadly rise in gangland crime and organised criminal syndicates.

    The legislation, and its Court, have been criticised by Amnesty International, the United Nations and the Irish Council of Civil Liberties over the last number of decades and at its inception by Mary Robinson.

    Most of the recent review group concluded that the use of a non-jury court is ‘justified’ and that the court is needed to counter ‘a real risk to juror intimidations.’ However, the review added, contradictorily, that there is ‘an absence of concrete evidence’ on the nature and extent of the risk posed to jurors today. The review added that a non-jury court should only be used in ‘an exceptional case.’

    One way that the review recommended this should be done is through abolishing ‘scheduled offences’ – where certain offences are automatically tried by a non-jury court – and placing the decision in the hands of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), which, it should be noted, is a political appointment.

    As an additional safeguard, the majority review recommended the appointment of a judge to review whether the correct procedure has been followed by the DPP, and whether the decision had been made based on of the evidence heard in that case alone. This would mean, under the new Court, that the DPP would decide whether it is suitable that a citizen, who stands accused of a crime, be tried in a non-jury court based on the evidence in the case, regardless of the case’s threat to national security.

    Accompanying the majority review, there is also a minority review which argues that the establishment of a permanent non-jury court is ‘constitutionally inappropriate’. The minority review said: ‘Just because something can be done does not mean it should be done, we are in danger in all sorts of way as Iseult O’Malley of the Irish Supreme Court said of becoming ‘overly habituated to the abnormal.’

    Commenting on the recommendation to replace the SCC with a new Special Criminal Court Minister for Justice Helen McEntee said that the Special Criminal Court eliminates the very real risk to jurors and potential jurors posed by subversives and organised criminal groups. She said that the recommendation from the review group ‘requires serious consideration’ due to the importance of the Special Criminal Court and its place in the Irish judicial system.

    Minister for Justice Helen McEntee.

    ‘Belief Evidence’

    As well as non-jury trials, the SCC has special powers to accept ‘belief-evidence’. This allows the belief of a Garda Chief Superintendent that a person is a member of an illegal organisation to be used and accepted as evidence of that person’s membership. While the majority’s report recommends that new legislation be created to provide more regulation around the use of non-jury courts, they have deemed the continuation of belief-evidence ‘appropriate’.

    While the report says that belief-evidence can continue to be used, it adds that someone must not be prosecuted ‘solely on the basis of that evidence.’ There needs to be corroboration. The minority simply notes that the UK police did not need belief evidence to prosecute and recommends its abolition.

    Last month, Minister Simon Harris, who took over as Justice Minister while McEntee was on maternity leave, received approval to propose the resolutions to extend the legislation. A Government spokesperson said Harris considered that there remained ‘a real and persistent threat from terrorist activity, primarily from so-called ‘dissident’ republican paramilitary groups.’

    The criminal court of justice, Dublin. Daniele Idini/Cassandra Voices

    Conclusion

    We appear to be witnessing a serious regression in the Rule of Law in Ireland, where unspecified threats to the state are decided in camera, and an extension to the use of judges without jury with police belief evidence continuing to be accepted. All of this twenty-five years after the signature of the Good Friday Agreement which effectively ended the Troubles.

  • Vigilance Required Against ‘Seepage’ of Emergency Legislation in Ireland

    On Thursday 19th of March, the Dáil passed emergency legislation in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The Health (Preservation and Protection and other Emergency Measures in the Public Interest) Bill has two main features.

    The first are financial measures assisting those affected, protecting living standards, and maintaining spending in the economy. The second aspect concerns laws permitting agents of the State to shut down mass gatherings and to order people to stay in their homes. Also, there are regulations allowing for the detention of a person, on foot of a medical recommendation, if they refuse to self-isolate.

    The rapid spread of the pandemic temporarily hands necessary draconian powers to a State that has already acquired other wide-ranging powers in response to subversive activity relating to the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and, more recently, violent gangland criminality. These have long been subjected to criticism by civil liberties activists in Ireland, including Mary Robinson, as well as external bodies, concerned by the unwarranted erosion of the rule of law.

    In particular, the Offences Against the State Act 1939 permits trial without jury before the Special Criminal Court. Subsequent Offences Against the State legislation created a number of special evidential provisions in response to the unique situation then at play in Ireland, including the use of ‘belief evidence’ of a Chief Superintendent before the Court and the drawing of ‘adverse inferences’ from the silence of a suspect in custody.

    Interestingly, the Special Criminal Court became the focus of a lengthy exchange during the leaders’ debate on RTÉ prior to February’s election, with Sinn Féin President Mary Lou McDonald repeatedly being asked to clarify her party’s position on the issue.

    Indeed, Fine Gael leader Leo Varadkar went so far as to rule out a coalition with Sinn Féin based on its purported view on the Court; his Fianna Fáil counterpart Micheál Martin then claimed that Sinn Féin always votes against the renewal of the Offences Against the State legislation on instruction from ‘their IRA old comrades.’[1]

    The problem with handing over such powers to the State is that once granted they are not easily relinquished, as the police and judiciary grow accustomed to their exercise. This has been the case with the Special Criminal Court that now sits in the impressive and imposing Criminal Courts of Justice building on Parkgate Street in Dublin.

    Protecting civil liberties, such as the right to jury trial, may seem less important as long as extraordinary powers are not abused. However, the existence of special powers poses the ongoing risk that they may be exploited by unscrupulous, or even tyrannical, politicians or agents of the state.

    This article provides background on the emergence of the Special Criminal Court, and the general criticisms that have been directed against the use of a non-jury trial, followed by an assessment of its use against organised crime. It also posits potential alternative practices that could be used to protect endangered juries. As we enter a prolonged period of draconian measures restricting our conduct it is salutary to consider the powers already at the disposal of the State.

    General Criticisms in the Use of a Non-jury Court

    The current Special Criminal Court has been subject to general criticism since its establishment in 1972. The justification for the existence of a non-jury court centred on the potential for juror intimidation and the fear that jurors could be coerced in their decision-making. In announcing the establishment of the Special Criminal Court, the then Minister for Justice, Desmond O’Malley, referred to the prevalent atmosphere of intimidation in courthouses and the threat of retaliation.[2]

    In response, a statement from the ‘Citizens for Civil Liberties’ on 26 May 1972 expressed the concern that the establishment of the Court would deprive citizens of the right to jury trial.[3] The introduction of belief evidence later that year[4] also sparked criticism from members of the academic community. Writing in 1974, Mary Robinson stated that, ‘in effect, this would not even be a case of one man’s word against another, but a case of belief which was based on undivulged facts and derived from undivulged sources – which could only be at second or third hand – being set against another man’s assertions’.[5]

    While the workload of the Special Criminal Court declined noticeably over the following decade, this appears to have been the result of a decline in subversive activity rather than the result of a policy change on behalf of the DPP.[6]

    Writing in 1989, Hogan and Walker noted the lack of political pressure to have the court disbanded and posited that this might be a tribute to the fairness and impartiality of the operation of the Special Criminal Court since 1972. However, they wrote that this also provided ‘disquieting evidence of the “seepage” of emergency legislation into the ordinary law of the State. What was once seen as a radical (and purely temporary) departure from standard norms has now become an accepted feature of the criminal justice system’.[7]

    While in 1996 the Supreme Court indicated the necessity that the Special Criminal Court be kept under constant review, it refused to find that the system was unconstitutional.[8]

    Human Rights Committee

    The use of the Special Criminal Court was criticised by the Human Rights Committee in 2001, which found that the State was in breach of the right to equal treatment, espoused by Article 26 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, given the power of the DPP to certify trial in the Special Criminal Court.[9]

    The Committee found the State to be in breach of the obligations under Article 26 and stated that it was critical to its conclusion that the DPP was under no obligation to provide reasons and that judicial review of his decision was ‘restricted to the most exceptional and virtually undemonstrable circumstances’.[10]

    In its 2002 report, the minority of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939–1998, which consisted of Hederman J. and Professor Dermot Walsh, focused on the primacy of the right to trial by jury, which they described as ‘a cornerstone of the criminal law system’ which  ‘ensures that the innocence or guilt of a person charged with an offence is determined by twelve randomly chosen members of the community, each of whom brings to the process the benefit of his or her life-experience and individual perspective.’[11]

    They noted that the risk of possible jury intimidation is reduced, that the members of the Court can be relied on not to be swayed by political views from convicting where the offence was politically inspired and that the prospects of conviction may be considered more likely, ‘not because the members of the Court are unfair but because studies have consistently shown that non-jury courts have a higher conviction rate than courts with trial by jury’.[12]

    Furthermore, Professor Dermot Walsh in his dissenting comments in the Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939–1998 argued that such exceptional criminal justice measures would, under the guise of combating terrorism, cause more lasting damage to basic democratic values and the rule of law than ‘the terrorists could ever hope to have achieved,’ and suggested the replacement of the standards underpinning the Offences Against the State legislation with ‘standards that are more firmly rooted in due process, civil liberties and human rights’.[13]

    In contrast the majority of the Committee stated that ‘as long as there is in existence a paramilitary threat to public peace and order, the need for the Special Criminal Court will probably remain.’

    In light of the majority recommendations, the operation of the Special Criminal Court has been maintained, despite on-going controversy in the context of organised crime, which is discussed below.

    Meanwhile, most of the recommendations made by the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939–1998 intended to align the legislative provisions with human rights norms have not been implemented and have largely been ignored by the State.

    In its 2014 report on Ireland, the United Nations Human Rights Committee highlighted its continued concern ‘at the lack of a definition of terrorism under domestic legislation and the continuing operation of the Special Criminal Court’.[14]

    The UNHR Committee called on the State to ‘introduce a definition of “terrorist acts” in its domestic legislation, limited to offences which can justifiably be equated with terrorism and its serious consequences’ and to consider the abolition of the Special Criminal Court completely. [15]

    Trial of Organised Crime in the Special Criminal Court

    In 2002, the majority of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939–1998 reported that juries in Ireland are ‘distinctly uncomfortable’ in cases involving organised crime and that attempts have been made to tamper with juries in high profile criminal trials in the ordinary courts. The Committee felt that the threat posed by organised crime was sufficiently serious to justify the continuation of the Special Criminal Court on that ground alone.[16] In DPP v Special Criminal Court & Ward,[17] Carney J stated:

    Those engaged in [organised] crime require a wall of silence to surround their activities and believe that its maintenance is necessary for their protection. They have at their disposal the resources, including money and firearms, to maintain this wall of silence and will resort to any necessary means, including murder, in furtherance of this objective.[18]

    It has been suggested that organised criminality is not ‘ordinary’ crime as such and measures akin to those used against suspected terrorists are warranted.[19]

    Criminal Justice Act 2009

    Despite the foregoing, the use of the Special Criminal Court for the purposes of non-subversive and organised crime has sparked heated debate in recent years. For example, the Criminal Justice Act 2009 was urgently passed through the Dáil against a background of increasing gangland violence and it evoked great controversy, with many lawyers publicly opposing it.

    A large group of lawyers penned a letter to The Irish Times expressing their dissatisfaction with the content of the Act and the manner in which it was rushed through the Houses of the Oireachtas. Among the complaints was the fact that the Act had been:

    … introduced without any research to support its desirability and without canvassing expert opinion or inviting contribution from interested parties on the issues. It appears now that it will be passed without proper debate in the Dáil because such debate has been guillotined by the Government. It is quite simply astounding that we as a society would jettison ancient rights and rules of evidence in such a manner and seemingly without regard to the effect such impetuous legislating might ultimately have on the respect for the rule of law in this country.[20]

    It was further argued, in relation to the Act’s provision for applications to extend time in detention to ‘be heard otherwise than in public’ and to the possible exclusion of the accused and his legal representatives,[21] that ‘the provision for secret hearings to extend detentions without the presence of the suspect or their lawyer’, was a stark departure from the principle that justice should be administered in public. The letter set out that:

    Secret hearings should be anathema to a system based on the rule of law. From the manner in which detention hearings are currently conducted, there is nothing to suggest that investigations would be compromised. In the main the court hears generalised evidence about the necessity for further time to carry out interrogations, forensic testing or assessment of evidence.[22]

    The Irish Council for Civil Liberties also criticised the encroachments on the rule of law:

    [T]his provision fundamentally alters the nature of criminal justice in Ireland. It allows for the judge to hear evidence of a Garda of any rank, in private, and without legal representation, in order to justify the continuing detention of a person … In essence what this means is that a person can be held without knowledge of the grounds on which the judge is justifying their continued detention. This detention can be justified by the secret information from any member of the Garda Síochána, regardless of his or her expertise or experience.

    In 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed particular concern ‘at the expansion of the remit of the Special Criminal Court to include organized crime’.[23]

    Flouting Human Rights

    With the announcement of the second Special Criminal Court in 2015, the debate regarding the justification and role, if any, of the Special Criminal Court, resurfaced. In June 2015, the Minister for Justice, Frances Fitzgerald, informed the Seanad that:

    Organised crime continues to present a significant law enforcement issue, with a number of criminal gangs continuing to engage in serious crimes. There is, unfortunately, stark evidence of the willingness of these gangs to engage in murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, drug smuggling, counterfeiting and other serious offences. We are also faced with the reality that there are growing links between paramilitary groups and organised crime. Given the nature of organised crime, the investigation and prosecution process can be lengthy and difficult.[24]

    In October 2015, the Director of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties shared an alternate view:

    The Special Criminal Court was created as an extraordinary court in extraordinary times; however, no reasonable person could today claim that there is a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. It is therefore unjustified that this Court’s procedures suspend fundamental fair trial guarantees, including the right to trial by jury. The UN Human Rights Committee has repeatedly identified the Special Criminal Court as being in violation of Ireland’s legal obligations under international human rights treaties and called for its abolition. In 2014 the Committee expressed particular concern ‘at the expansion of the remit of the Special Criminal Court to include organised crime’.

    The continuation, much less the expansion, of such a court in peacetime flouts Ireland’s human rights obligations and is not necessary in a democratic society. Crime, particularly violent and gang crime, are a legitimate concern for our legislators. Tackling such crime must not rely, however, on chipping away at the right to a fair trial, but on a commitment to adequately resourcing An Garda Síochána and the regular Courts.[25]

    More recently, in November 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Professor Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, commented on the Special Criminal Court regime.

    At a lecture hosted by the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) and the International Network of Civil Liberties Organisations (INCLO), she stated that ‘the Island of Ireland, more so than many parts of the world has experienced emergency law, emergency practice and the seepage of the exceptional into the ordinary in ways that has not served the rule of law nor the protection of human rights well.’ She pointed out that there had been ‘consistent and trenchant concerns about the use of the Special Criminal Court and the Offences Against the State Act as a “work-around” the ordinary protection of the law’.[26]

    The Future

    There is a genuine risk that the use of non-jury trial, originally an emergency measure, is becoming normalised. It is disappointing that the debate and dialogue in Ireland surrounding the Special Criminal Court have primarily revolved around two poles; jury or non-jury trial. There has been little political discussion of intermediate alternatives for protecting jurors, which, in modern times, might include the use of technological solutions to some of the problems posed by potential jury intimidation.

    One possibility would be to allow the jury to observe proceedings from a remote location, though it must be acknowledged that such protective measures may have a prejudicial effect and may invite the jury to draw negative connotations about the culpability of the accused. Options such as transporting the jury to their homes or taking steps to anonymise the jury[27] may not be as feasible in Ireland given the small size of the country and would again involve the risk of prejudice towards the accused where the jury members are aware of the protective measures taken. A more realistic option to prevent juror intimidation would be to limit the right to inspect the panel from which the jury is drawn, as has been done in Northern Ireland.[28]

    If the Special Criminal Court is to remain in being, it would be preferable that the decision regarding form of trial should lie with the courts rather than the DPP or the legislature.[29] Instead of using a system of scheduling a vast number of offences which are presumptively tried before the Special Criminal Court, each case should be considered on an individual basis.[30]

    The right to jury trial was described by Thomas Jefferson as ‘the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.’[31] One would have thought that in light of the high status formally accorded to trial by jury in the Irish Constitution, these alternatives would merit serious consideration.

    Conclusion

    The current Special Criminal Court was established in 1972 as an emergency measure in response to a unique set of circumstances then at play in Ireland. It would appear, however, that the court now has de-facto permanency in our criminal justice system. While the majority of trials in the Special Criminal Court continue to involve subversive activity, prosecution of organised crime in the court is increasing and a situation has now arisen where emergency powers have become normalised.

    Now, as the Government responds to an unusual situation for Ireland with emergency legislation, it is worthwhile to bear in mind the earlier response to subversive activity in Ireland and – in the words of Hogan and Walker – the ‘disquieting evidence of the “seepage” of emergency legislation into the ordinary law of the State.’

    [1] Ceimin Burke, ‘Explainer: What is the Special Criminal Court and what is Sinn Féin’s stance on it?’, The Journal, February 6th, 2020, https://www.thejournal.ie/special-criminal-court-explainer-4993281-Feb2020/

    [2]Davis, The History and Development of the Special Criminal Court 1922–2014 (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014) 169, citing 261 Dáil Debates (15 June 1972), col 1765.

    [3]McInerney, ‘Special Courts Introduced’ (1972) The Irish Times, 27 May, 9.

    [4]‘Belief evidence’ was introduced by the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1972, s 3(2), which was passed on 3 December 1972. The provision is discussed in detail in Ch 6.

    [5]Robinson, The Special Criminal Court (Dublin University Press, 1974) 31.

    [6]Hogan and Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (Manchester University Press, 1989) 237.

    [7]Hogan and Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (Manchester University Press, 1989) 239.

    [8]Kavanagh v Ireland [1996] 1 IR 321.

    [9]The powers of the DPP in this regard are discussed in detail in Ch 2.

    [10]Kavanagh v Ireland, Decision of the UN Human Rights Committee (CCPR/C/71/D/819/1998, 4 April 2001), at para 10.2.

    [11]Hederman et al, Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939–1998 (2002), at paras 9.88–9.

    [12]Hederman et al, Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939–1998 (2002), at para 9.90.

    [13]Hederman et al, Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939–1998 (2002), 255–261.

    [14]United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Ireland’, CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 (19 August 2014). The Committee had previously expressed concern in 1993 (Comments of the Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/79/Add 21 (3 August 1993)); 2000 (Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol I, Gen Ass, 55th Sess, Supp No 40, A/55/40 (10 Oct 2000)); 2008 (Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Ireland’, CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3 (30 July 2008)); and 2013 (‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya: Addendum to Ireland’ A/HRC/22/47/Add.3 (26 February 2013)).

    [15]United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Ireland’, CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 (19 August 2014).

    [16]Hederman et al, Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Act 1939–1998 (2002), at paras 9.33–9.36.

    [17]DPP v Special Criminal Court & Ward [1999] 1 IR 60.

    [18]DPP v Special Criminal Court & Ward [1999] 1 IR 60, 63.

    [19]Campbell, Organised Crime and the Law: A Comparative Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2013) 128.

    [20]Undersigned Solicitors and Barristers, ‘Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill’, (Letter to the Editor) (2009) The Irish Times, 8 July.

    [21]Pursuant the Criminal Justice Act 2007, s 50(4A).

    [22]Undersigned Solicitors and Barristers, ‘Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill’, (Letter to the Editor) (2009) The Irish Times, 8 July.

    [23]United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Ireland’, CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 (19 August 2014).

    [24]Seanad Debates, Vol 240 No 9 (11 June 2015). The Minister was speaking to the Seanad in support of a resolution to continue in operation s 8 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, which adds certain ‘organised crimes’ to the schedule of offences that can be tried before the Special Criminal Court.

    [25]‘Special Criminal Court Decision ‘Flouts Rule of Law’, says ICCL’, ICCL Press Release (29 October 2015). https://www.iccl.ie/press-release/special-criminal-court-decision-flouts-rule-of-law-says-iccl/ accessed 20 January 2019.

    [26]‘UN expert criticises the Special Criminal Court and the Offences Against the State Act’, ICCL Press Release (21 November 2018).

    [27]These steps include referring to them by number only, housing them in a secret location and monitoring their calls, as occurred in United States v Gotti 777 F Supp 224 (EDNY 1991).

    [28] Juries (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (SI 1996/1141 (NI 6)), Art 26A, as inserted by the Northern Ireland Act 2007, s 10. This was found not to breach the Art 6 right to a fair trial in Re McParland [2008] NIQB 1. See Campbell, ‘The prosecution of organised crime: removing the jury’, (2014) 18(2) IJEP 83, 97. See also, the recent recommendations of Seymour CB in relation to non-jury trials in Northern Ireland (Seymour CB, Report of the Independent Reviewer Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, Tenth Report 1 August 2016 – 31 July 2017 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, April 2018), at para 23.2).

    [29]As suggested by Campbell (Campbell, ‘The Prosecution of Organised Crime: Removing the Jury’ (2014) 18(2) IJEP 83, 100).

    [30]This proposal was suggested by Dr Liz Campbell in her article, ‘The Prosecution of Organised Crime: Removing the Jury’, (2014) 18(2) IJEP 83, 100. It may be noted that, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Pt VII, which was commenced in January 2007, provides that trials on indictment may be held without a jury in cases where there is a risk of jury tampering. Under s 45 of the 2003 Act, the parties will attend a preparatory hearing prior to the decision to hold a non-jury trial and are given an opportunity to make representations with regard to the decision. This safeguard does not apply where non-jury trial is certified in relation to offences with a political or religious motivation in Northern Ireland under the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 and is non-existent in Ireland. As Independent Reviewer of the powers under the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, David Seymour CB has proposed that the Public Prosecution Service could, once they have formed a view that a non-jury trial certificate should be issued but before the submission goes to the DPP, notify the defendant that they are minded to issue a certificate, specifying the condition or conditions and any other material which is in the public domain, and invite representations within a specified period. This would lead to increased transparency in the process, a reduction of the risk of judicial review and to circumstances where the final decision of the DPP would be fully informed, particularly if the defence made coherent and plausible representations that, for example, the conditions relied on were not met. (Seymour, Report of the Independent Reviewer Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, Tenth Report 1 August 2016–31 July 2017 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, April 2018), at para 23.3).

    [31] The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 15, 27 March 1789 – 30 November 1789, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, pp. 266–270. ‘From Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine, 11 July 1789,’ Founders Online, National Archives, accessed September 29, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0259.