{"id":16949,"date":"2024-10-22T17:48:11","date_gmt":"2024-10-22T16:48:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cassandravoices.com\/?p=16949"},"modified":"2024-10-22T17:48:11","modified_gmt":"2024-10-22T16:48:11","slug":"the-missing-link-in-draghis-e-u-plan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/2024\/10\/22\/the-missing-link-in-draghis-e-u-plan\/","title":{"rendered":"The Missing Link in Draghi’s E.U. Plan"},"content":{"rendered":"

This article is the first in a forthcoming three-part series by Cillian Doyle on the role of the state in a mixed economy.
\n<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Last month there were two seemingly unrelated events which in an Irish context can be connected. On September 9th<\/sup> Mario Draghi\u2019s published his 400-page report<\/a><\/span> on improving E.U. competitiveness. The report provides a series of recommendations for how the E.U., in the face of changing geopolitical realities, can acquire new industrial policy tools to deal with its \u2018existential challenge<\/em>\u2019.<\/p>\n

A day later the Irish government was given the awkward news it had lost the Apple tax case. Despite its legal advisor Paul Gallagher describing the Commission\u2019s case as \u2018fundamentally flawed, confused and inconsistent\u2019, <\/em>that\u2019s not how the ECJ saw it.<\/em> Its punishment \u2013 \u20ac14 billion in additional tax revenue. As a result, it now has a financial war chest available for investment, but a dearth of policy ideas.<\/p>\n

This series deals with each in turn.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Europe at the Crossroads<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Draghi\u2019s report was intended to provide some harsh truths to E.U. leaders, by making them confront the reasons for Europe\u2019s decline. Placing this within the wider geopolitical context, his report stresses that the E.U. continues to fall further behind the U.S. and China, whose successful innovation is being driven by \u2018subsidies, industrial policies, state ownership and other practices<\/em><\/a><\/span>\u2019<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Writing in the Financial Times<\/em> Adam Tooze argued that the report\u2019s real target was \u2018not China but the U.S.<\/a><\/span>\u2019. Perhaps Draghi and other E.U. policymakers felt catching China was a step too far but that matching the U.S. was a more realistic prospect. When we look at the share of global growth over the last ten years (2013-23) accruing to China, versus that of the U.S. and the E.U., we can see why (Figure 1).<\/p>\n

Figure 1<\/p>\n

% Share of 10 year global growth: China vs U.S. vs E.U. (2013-23)<\/em><\/p>\n

\"\"Source: World Economics Database <\/em><\/p>\n

Speaking shortly after the publication, Draghi seemed to underscore Tooze\u2019s point, stressing that the E.U. was not only looking to defend itself from China, as much of the media commentary suggested, but also from the U.S..<\/p>\n

This recalled the discussion around the need for \u2018strategic autonomy\u2019<\/em> that was flirted with during the Trump administration, when it was argued Europe was best placed serving as a third pillar and bridge between the U.S. and China. Something hastily forgotten with the election of the Biden administration and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Since then, the von der Leyen Commission has stood firmly behind the U.S., so much so that even Foreign Policy <\/em>magazine stated she \u2018Might be too pro-American for Europe<\/span>\u2019<\/em><\/a>. The world is increasingly bifurcating into two blocs; \u2018Team Unipolar<\/em>\u2019 led by the U.S. along with the E.U. and other G7 members, and \u2018Team Multipolar<\/em>\u2019 led by the BRICS group, the relatively new intergovernmental organisation, which is growing in confidence and size (see figure 3).<\/p>\n

Figure 2<\/p>\n

% Share of 10-year global growth: the West vs BRICS (2013-23)<\/em><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Source: World Economics Database <\/em><\/p>\n

This hasn\u2019t gone unnoticed by the E.U. institutions. The E.U. engages with BRICS, although it stresses on an \u2018individual basis\u2019<\/em>. Last year<\/a><\/span> the E.U. Parliament\u2019s Committee on International Trade as part of their engagement with the Commission \u2018underlined the need to keep an eye on the group\u2019s expansion, especially considering the effect of a potential BRICS+ currency and the consequences for E.U. trade policy.<\/em>\u2019<\/p>\n

Figure 3<\/p>\n

BRICS expansion 2023-2024<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

BRICS encourages members to transact in domestic currencies for bilateral trade, as opposed to transacting in dollars and to a lesser extent the euro. They\u2019re also trying to develop an alternative payment system to Belgian-based Swift. The dollar and Swift are key to the U.S. sanctions regime, and hence seen as posing risks.<\/p>\n

The Washington Post<\/a><\/span> pointed out that the U.S.\u2019 is currently subjecting around one third of countries in the world to some form of economic or financial sanction. Many of these are developing countries now looking towards BRICS as an alternative to the U.S. Rules Based Order<\/em>, and Western dominated multilateral institutions (IMF\/World Bank).<\/p>\n

Earlier this month U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated that through its \u2018human rights\u2019<\/em> based foreign policy, the U.S. succeeded in rallying \u2018the international community<\/em>\u2019 behind its Russian sanctions policy. However, as the Quincy Institute <\/a><\/span>pointed out, \u2018the large majority of countries around the world that have refused to join in sanctions and have called for an early peace \u2014 a call that has been repeatedly snubbed by Washington<\/em>\u2019.<\/p>\n

It was primarily the other members of Team Unipolar<\/em> which rowed in behind the leader, with the von der Leyen Commission being particularly enthusiastic. As research by Thomas Fazi<\/a><\/span> has shown, she used this exercise to assume more competencies for the Commission at the expense of E.U. Member States.<\/p>\n

Some portray this growing global divergence as one between democracies and autocracies. As Joseph Borrell recently acknowledged, however, this framing is used for political reasons. As he said himself, the West is allied with plenty of autocracies on the basis that they\u2019re aligned with Western foreign policy.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Super Mario World<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Where the E.U.\u2019s future lies in all of this remains to be seen. But in the meantime, it must confront its challenges which are real, severe, and somewhat self-inflicted. Draghi\u2019s report sets out in stark terms its relative decline in output and productivity growth. The latter singled out as a primary cause of its sagging growth. His report couldn\u2019t have been published at a more appropriate time with the likes of Germany, Austria and Sweden falling into recession.<\/p>\n

Figure 4: GDP growth rates Q2 2024<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

% Change over previous quarter (seasonally adjusted)<\/em>[1]<\/a><\/p>\n

His report attempts to shift the E.U. away from what\u2019s often seemed like a single-minded focus on competition policy, toward a new focus on industrial policy<\/em> (hereafter IP). Whether such sweeping changes are possible in the absence of significant E.U. treaty change has been debated by legal scholars (see here<\/a><\/span> for one critique).<\/p>\n

I\u2019m more concerned with its proposed economic reforms, and in particular one which was curiously absent. It\u2019s true these present something of a departure from established E.U. policy thinking and the conventional (neoclassical) economic philosophy which has generally underlain it.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s also worth noting that up until quite recently, IP was described as \u2018the economic practice that dares not speak its name<\/em>\u2019. Or as one leading member of the profession once said, \u2018the best industrial policy is none at all<\/em>.\u2019<\/p>\n

Yet with the success of China\u2019s IP and the U.S.\u2019 recent adoption through the CHIPS <\/em>Act and the hilariously misnamed Inflation Reduction<\/em> Act, the E.U. had to act in kind. For students of history, those with an interest in development economics, or a general disdain for market fundamentalism, this move may have seemed long overdue.<\/p>\n

Every major power that developed did so through successful IP. The rapid recovery of Western Europe after WW2 was built on the back of it. The East Asian Tiger economies managed rapid industrialisation and technological advancement through a developmentalist approach, which often shirked the dictates of the Washington Consensus<\/em>.<\/p>\n

But if you were thinking Draghi\u2019s proposed \u2018new Industrial Deal<\/em>\u2019 portends the return of state capitalism in a \u2018post neoliberal\u2019<\/em> world \u2013 not so fast. It was as interesting for what it didn\u2019t say, as much as for what it did. The five most common tools of IP are (1) state-owned enterprises (SOEs), (2) trade policy, (3) public R&D, (4) long-term financing and (5) targeted supports for business.<\/p>\n

Table 1: Key recommendations of Draghi Report<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Industrial Policy <\/strong><\/p>\n

Instrument<\/strong><\/td>\n

Draghi Report?<\/strong><\/td>\nRecommendation(s)<\/strong><\/td>\nComment<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
State-owned<\/p>\n

enterprises<\/td>\n

No<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Trade policy<\/td>\nYes<\/p>\n

 <\/td>\n

A new \u201cForeign Economic policy<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

Coordinate purchases based on the European Union\u2019s large internal market.<\/p>\n

Greater focus on need for E.U. Strategic Autonomy<\/td>\n

Use of preferential trade agreements to help facilitate direct investments in resource rich countries. More E.U. common procurement.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Public R&D<\/td>\nYes<\/p>\n

 <\/td>\n

Creating a European Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), suggests increasing R&D spending, investing in research infrastructure, and fostering a more innovation-friendly regulatory ecosystem<\/td>\nSays there\u2019s a need to tackle fragmented public R&D spending. Increase public R&D spending. Streamline multi-country trial management to make the E.U. a more attractive location for clinical R&D<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Long-term<\/p>\n

Financing, investment<\/td>\n

 <\/p>\n

Yes<\/p>\n

 <\/td>\n

Common E.U. borrowing framework,<\/p>\n

Need for additional investment (\u20ac800m p\/a)<\/p>\n

E.U. Capital Markets Union,<\/p>\n

Banking Union<\/td>\n

Common borrowing could be a powerful tool but likely to draw resistance from certain E.U. states (i.e Germany). Desire to shift E.U. away from bank-based finance to market based finance (shadow banking).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Targeted business<\/p>\n

support<\/td>\n

 <\/p>\n

Yes<\/td>\n

Replacing state aid with European aid, simpler and more flexible regulation for SMEs, reduced administrative burdens<\/td>\nGDPR legislation to be re-examined in the context of companies working on AI. Increasing computational capacity dedicated to the training and fine-tuning of AI models for innovative E.U. SMEs<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

As we can see above, there\u2019s a glaring omission from \u2018Super Mario\u2019s<\/em>\u2019 toolkit. Any serious discussion of the role of SOEs was absent. But we\u2019ll return to this in part 2 and 3. First let\u2019s deal with some of the report\u2019s big takeaways.<\/p>\n

The headline figure which stands out was the call for increased investment of around \u20ac800 million per annum to ensure the E.U. meets its key competitiveness, climate and defence targets. This equates to the E.U. investing around 5% of its income on an annual basis. There\u2019s something of an historical irony here.<\/p>\n

You might recall a certain former Greek Finance Minister proposing this very measure. Yanis Varoufakis once proposed allowing the European Investment Bank (EIB) to issue bonds which would have been purchased by the ECB to fund a Green New Deal<\/em>. Despite presenting his proposal to E.U. Finance Ministers and Central Bankers, he was given short shrift.<\/p>\n

Whether such a measure is now possible seems unlikely. As Varoukafis points out<\/a><\/span>, the disillusionment with the much smaller sized issuance of bonds by the Commission \u2013 as part of its NextGenerationEU<\/em> \u2013 means there\u2019s unlikely to be much appetite from investors or member-states at the more ambitious scale outlined by Draghi.<\/p>\n

Investors doubt the Commission\u2019s ability to sufficiently expand its fiscal powers, and member states \u2013 particularly groups like the German ordoliberals \u2013 are cautious that such borrowing would be a Trojan Horse for the Commission to massively expand its tax competencies.<\/p>\n

In terms of trade policy, it argues for a new \u2018foreign economic policy\u2019<\/em> explicitly described as \u2018statecraft\u2019<\/em>. This would marry decarbonisation with support of direct investments in resource rich countries. Preferential trade agreements could serve as bargaining chips to encourage such resource rich countries to open up to E.U. investment.<\/p>\n

It doesn\u2019t hide the sense of urgency behind this, stating bluntly the E.U. has \u2018lost its most important supplier of energy, Russia<\/em>.\u2019 It\u2019s less the case that the E.U. has completely<\/em> lost access, and more that due to sanctions it\u2019s now purchasing Russian energy at a higher price via secondary countries (Turkey, Azerbaijan, etc), albeit at reduced levels.<\/p>\n

This coupled with rising tariffs on China (e.g. from 10% to 45% on EVs over the next five years) means the German economy \u2013 the E.U.\u2019s workhorse \u2013 has, on the one hand, been starved of cheap energy inputs. On the other, its main trading partner (China) is demonstrating less demand for its high-quality outputs (cars, chemical products, etc).<\/p>\n

Germany is thus undergoing deindustrialisation. The U.S., thanks to its new IP turn and the manufacturing subsidies it\u2019s now providing, has been one of the main beneficiaries. Deloitte<\/a><\/span> found that two thirds of German companies had moved some of their operations overseas. That\u2019s good news for the U.S., but bad news for Germany.<\/p>\n

Member states are also incurring high costs from the construction of LNG infrastructure (terminals, storage, and regasification units). Over 50% of LNG imports are from the U.S.. Again, good news for the U.S., but bad news for member states bearing the higher costs associated with LNG, placing it at a competitive disadvantage.<\/p>\n

One thing that seems to have been lost on the E.U. Commission is that they\u2019ve replaced the energy risk associated with one overly dominant supplier (Russia), with that of another (the U.S.), whilst locking in higher prices for supply. If some future U.S. administration were to tax LNG exports<\/a><\/span> to the E.U., then it could find itself at an even<\/em> further competitive disadvantage.<\/p>\n

The report sets out various recommendations to boost public R&D and thereby help E.U. companies to innovate, particularly those in the tech sector. As we can see from table 2 of the top 10 public research institutions according to Nature Index Research Leaders 2024<\/em>, seven of these were Chinese institutions, with just two from the E.U. and one from the U.S..<\/p>\n

In terms of the top 10 technology companies and banking institutions the situation for the E.U. is worse again. It\u2019s not represented in the top 10 in either category. Draghi thus wants to allow for greater ease of mergers between E.U. tech companies which it\u2019s hoped would see them rival their U.S.\/Chinese counterparts.<\/p>\n

Table 2:<\/p>\n

Top 10 Research Institutions, Tech companies and Banks<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\nR&D (2024)[2]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/td>\nTechnology (2023)[3]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/td>\nBanking (2024)[4]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Rank<\/strong><\/td>\nInstitution\/Country<\/strong><\/td>\nCompany<\/strong><\/td>\nFinancial institution<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1<\/td>\nChinese Academy of Sciences (China<\/em>)<\/td>\nApple<\/p>\n

(U.S.<\/em>)<\/td>\n

JP Morgan Chase<\/p>\n

(U.S.<\/em>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

2<\/td>\nHarvard University<\/p>\n

(U.S.<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Alphabet<\/p>\n

(U.S.<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Bank of America<\/p>\n

(U.S.<\/em>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

3<\/td>\nMax Planck Society<\/p>\n

(E.U.<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Samsung<\/p>\n

(South Korea<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

4<\/td>\nUniversity of Chinese Academy of Sciences<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Foxconn<\/p>\n

(Taiwan<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Agricultural Bank of China<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

5<\/td>\nUniversity of Science and Technology China<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Microsoft<\/p>\n

(U.S.<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Wells Fargo<\/p>\n

(U.S.<\/em>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

6<\/td>\nPeking University<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Meta<\/p>\n

(U.S.<\/em>)<\/td>\n

China Construction Bank Corp<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

7<\/td>\nFrench National Centre for Scientific Research<\/p>\n

(E.U.<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Dell Technologies<\/p>\n

(U.S.<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Bank of China<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

8<\/td>\nNanjing University<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Huawei<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Royal Bank of Canada<\/p>\n

(Canada<\/em>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

9<\/td>\nZhejiang University<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Sony<\/p>\n

(Japan<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Commonwealth Bank of Australia<\/p>\n

(Aus<\/em>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

10<\/td>\nTsinghua University<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n

Tencent<\/p>\n

(China<\/em>)<\/td>\n

HSBC Holdings<\/p>\n

(U.K.<\/em>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

Financialisaton: Problem or Solution?<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Draghi sees a \u2018lack of finance<\/em>\u2019 as being at the heart of the problem, unsurprising given his former roles in investment banking (Goldman Sachs) and central banking (Italy\/ECB). He thus stresses the need to complete the E.U. Capital Markets Union (CMU) as a remedy for this.<\/p>\n

The CMU is intended to bring about an E.U.-wide union for market-based forms of financing (think asset managers, hedge funds, private equity, pension funds, etc), to provide an alternative to what has been traditionally, predominantly bank-based finance in Europe. This could allow for more equity-based financing as E.U. companies choose this over initial public offering (IPO) their stock.<\/p>\n

But it will also mean a single European market for the alphabet soup of obscure acronyms which denote the various complex, opaque, and risky financial instruments that got us into trouble during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. Essentially, more shadow banking. Is this really what the E.U. needs? It\u2019s certainly taken as axiomatic that it is.<\/p>\n

The assumption is that the CMU would help to drive capital to SMEs and the real economy, which they see as overly dependent on bank finance. However, in the run up to 2008 U.S. capital markets had become highly developed, and it\u2019s not clear at all that this led to increased lending to their SMEs or the real economy.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s clear is that it led to huge levels of debt, the risk of which was masked in the system through opaque and poorly understood financial engineering techniques. And when it went sour it led to massive contagion effects, which brought down many financial institutions leading to costly public bailouts.<\/p>\n

One of the main problems the E.U. faces, although not alluded in the report, is that it\u2019s allowed itself to be turned into (to a varied extent among member states) a high-cost, financialised economy with declining public provision, largely privatised primary health care services, high-cost housing, and childcare, and poor and deteriorating public infrastructure.<\/p>\n

Financialisaton has rightly been criticised on the basis that it can lead to increased financial fragility and the risk of financial crises. But it\u2019s also identified as shifting the \u2018orientation of the non-financial sector towards financial activities ultimately leading to lower physical investment, hence to stagnant or fragile growth, as well as long term stagnation in productivity<\/em>\u2019 (Tori and Onaran 2017).<\/p>\n

Figure 5: Growth of Financialisaton in Europe<\/p>\n

Total Financial Assets (TFA) as a % of GDP (2000-23)<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Source: ECB Data Portal<\/p>\n

The Fingerprints of Institutional Investors<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Another issue with financialisaton is that it provides financial elites with more power.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s interesting to note who Draghi consulted as part of the research that fed into his report. The economist Isabella Weber pointed out the list of stakeholders consulted lists four pages of \u201ctrade and business associations<\/em>\u201d, \u201cprofessional consultancies<\/em>\u201d and \u201ccompanies and groups<\/em>\u201d, but just a single trade union.<\/p>\n

There was a total of 82 companies\/corporate groups which fed into it. These ranged from large PLCs, to established private companies, to even newer start-ups. But they also included some current or former commercial SOEs (25), which makes the lack of consideration of public enterprise even more noteworthy.<\/p>\n

These companies\/groups covered a broad range of industry sectors including: finance, extractive, transport, pharma, tech and so on. Table 3 examines 72 of these, for which some or all data could be compiled, and looks at that their level of institutional ownership, notable institutional owners, and state-owned shareholdings.<\/p>\n

The reason for doing this is simple. Over the last few decades, the ownership landscape of companies has changed radically. Whereas in the past large companies were owned by individuals, pension funds, insurers and indeed states, today they\u2019re overwhelmingly owned by asset managers. These are financial intermediaries investing on behalf of wealthy individuals, pensions funds or other financial institutions.<\/p>\n

Today they\u2019ve extraordinary levels of assets under management (AUM). By one estimate they own \u20ac1.8 trillion worth of real estate in Europe. Brett Christophers\u2019 book Our Lives in their Portfolios <\/em>highlights how asset managers have also become major owners of public infrastructure throughout Europe. He describes our current juncture as being one of \u2018asset manager society\u2019<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Many Europeans have some sense of this, but may be unaware of the extent to which they\u2019ve come to own such large shareholdings in companies across most sectors. This explains their description as \u2018universal owners\u2019<\/em>: their portfolios are so large and diversified that they represent a chunk of the entire economy.<\/p>\n

Of the companies that fed into the report a significant level of institutional ownership is observed, with the highest being NXP Semiconductors (95.37%). Excluding those which had no institutional ownership (5 cases), the average level of institutional ownership was 40%. As we can see Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street feature heavily.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Table 3- Ownership structure: Institutional owners vs state owners<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Corporate body group<\/strong><\/td>\n% shares held institutional investors<\/strong><\/td>\nNotable institutional <\/strong><\/p>\n

Shareholders (Big Three italicised) <\/strong><\/td>\n

Former SOE?<\/strong><\/td>\n% shares held state investors[5]<\/a><\/strong><\/td>\nNotable state<\/strong><\/p>\n

shareholders<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

Airbus<\/td>\n32.80%<\/td>\nAmundi, State Street<\/em><\/td>\nYes?<\/td>\n25.7%<\/td>\nFrance, Germany, Spain<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Air France KLM<\/td>\n6.08%<\/td>\nVanguard<\/em><\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n41.7%<\/td>\nFrance, Netherlands, China<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Alstom<\/td>\n71.20%<\/td>\nVanguard<\/em><\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n25.04%<\/td>\nCanada, France<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Amazon<\/td>\n50.81%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock<\/em>, Fidelity, State Street<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Amundi<\/td>\n6.08%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock<\/em>, Fidelity<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0.47%<\/td>\nNorway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ariston Group<\/td>\n34.76%<\/td>\nSchroder Investment Management, Vanguard, Blackrock<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n9.94%<\/td>\nNorway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ASML<\/td>\n21.10%<\/td>\nCapital Research and Management Company, Blackrock<\/em>, Amundi<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BASF<\/td>\n43%<\/td>\nAmundi, State Street<\/em><\/td>\n<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Bayer<\/td>\n44%<\/td>\nBlackrock, Vanguard<\/em>, Oakmark<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n6.67%<\/td>\nNorway, Singapore<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BMW Group<\/td>\n17.61%<\/td>\nAQTON SE, Vanguard<\/em>, Amundi<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n1%<\/td>\nNorway, Australia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BNP Paribas<\/td>\n82.60%<\/td>\nBlackrock<\/em>, Amundi, Vanguard<\/em>, Oakmark, iShares (Blackrock)<\/em><\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n7%<\/td>\nBelgium, Luxembourg<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Bolt<\/td>\n26.00%<\/td>\nFidelity, Sequoia Capital<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Clarios<\/td>\n30% est.<\/td>\nBrookfield Asset Management<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n25% est.<\/td>\nCanada<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Deutsche Telekom<\/td>\n69.40%<\/td>\nVanguard<\/em>, Goldman Sachs<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n27.80%<\/td>\nGermany<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
DHL Group<\/td>\n0.04%<\/td>\nAltrius Capital Management, Amundi, State Street<\/em><\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n17%<\/td>\nGermany<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Domp\u00e9 Farmaceutici<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
EDF<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\nCurrent<\/td>\n100%<\/td>\nFrance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Enel<\/td>\n58.60%<\/td>\nVanguard<\/em>, Goldman Sachs<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n23.6%<\/td>\nItaly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENGIE<\/td>\n21.18%<\/td>\nBlackrock, Vanguard<\/em>, Capital Research and Management<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n23.64%<\/td>\nFrance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ENI<\/td>\n51.35%<\/td>\nMorgan Stanley, Blackrock<\/em>, Natixis, Goldman Sachs<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n30.50%<\/td>\nItaly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Equinor ASA<\/td>\n6.60%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock, State Street<\/em>, DNB Asset Management<\/td>\nCurrent<\/td>\n71%<\/td>\nNorway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ericsson<\/td>\n9.30%<\/td>\nHotchkis & Wiley Capital, Morgan Stanley, Vanguard<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Euroclear<\/td>\n21.47%<\/td>\nFidelity, Citibank<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n32.50%<\/td>\nBelgium, France, NZ, China<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Euronext<\/td>\n61.02%<\/td>\nCDP Equity SpA (Private Equity), Amundi, Capital A Management BV, Vanguard<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n8.03%<\/td>\nFrance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ExxonMobil<\/td>\n57.82%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock, State Street<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
E.on<\/td>\n60%<\/td>\nBlackrock<\/em><\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n4.90%<\/td>\nCanada<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ferrovie<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\nCurrent<\/td>\n100%<\/td>\nItaly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
FINCANTIERI<\/td>\n4.20%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock<\/em><\/td>\nCurrent<\/td>\n71.44%<\/td>\nItaly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Flix<\/td>\n35.00%<\/td>\nEQT Future. K\u00fchne Holding, Vanguard<\/em>, Fidelity<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Glencore<\/td>\n41%<\/td>\nBlackrock, Vanguard<\/em>, EUROPACIFIC GROWTH FUND<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n8.60%<\/td>\nQatar<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Google<\/td>\n61.98%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock, State Street<\/em>, Morgan Stanley<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n1.83%<\/td>\nNorway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Iberdrola<\/td>\n77.80%<\/td>\nBlackrock<\/em>, Vanguard<\/em>, Fidelity<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n12.15%<\/td>\nQatar, Norway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Infineon Technologies<\/td>\n24.70%<\/td>\niShares (Blackrock), Blackrock<\/em>, Amundi<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Investor AB<\/td>\n25.42%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock<\/em>, Fidelity<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n2.65%<\/td>\nNorway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Leonardo<\/td>\n50.30%<\/td>\nVanguard<\/em>, Dimensional Fund Advisors LP, Capital World Growth and Income Fund<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n30.20%<\/td>\nItaly<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Lufthansa Group<\/td>\n54%<\/td>\nVanguard, iShares (Blackrock)<\/em>, Goldman Sachs<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
LyondellBasell Industries<\/td>\n73.18%<\/td>\nBlackrock, Vanguard, State Street<\/em>, Dodge & Cox<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
L’Or\u00e9al<\/td>\n37.33%<\/td>\nAmundi, State Street<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Maersk<\/td>\n25.19%<\/td>\nVanguard, iShares (Blackrock)<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
McPhy Energy<\/td>\n17.14%<\/td>\nGlobal X Hydrogen ETF<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n19.14%<\/td>\nFrance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Mercedes Benz<\/td>\n45.95%<\/td>\nAmundi, State Street<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n15.50%<\/td>\nChina, Kuwait<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Meta<\/td>\n79.06%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock, State Street<\/em>, Fidelity<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Meyer Burger Technology<\/td>\n19.52%<\/td>\nVanguard,<\/em> Scupltor, Credit Suisse<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n2.99%<\/td>\nNorway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Neste<\/td>\n31.69%<\/td>\nVanguard, iShares (Blackrock),<\/em> Fidelity<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n44.77%<\/td>\nFinland<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Nokia<\/td>\n6.17%<\/td>\nDANSKE INVEST FINNISH EQUITY FUND, Blackrock<\/em>, Goldman Sachs<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n5.7%<\/td>\nFinland<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NovoNordisk<\/td>\n71.80%<\/td>\nJennison Associates, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, Vanguard<\/em>, Fidelity<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NXP Semiconductors<\/td>\n95.37%<\/td>\nFidelity, JP Morgan, Vanguard, State Street<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Orange<\/td>\n16.52%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock<\/em>, Thornburg, UBS<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n22.9%<\/td>\nFrance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00d8rsted<\/td>\n10.71%<\/td>\nBlackrock<\/em>, Amundi, Vanguard, iShares (Blackrock)<\/em><\/td>\nCurrent<\/td>\n50.1%<\/td>\nDenmark<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
OVHcloud<\/td>\n12.62%<\/td>\nKKR, Towerbrook Capital Partners<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Renault<\/td>\n29.04%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock<\/em>, Paradigm Asset Management Company<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n15%<\/td>\nFrance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Repsol<\/td>\n33.61%<\/td>\nBlackrock, Vanguard<\/em>, iShares (Blackrock<\/em>), Fidelity<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n3.20%<\/td>\nNorway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Rolls Royce<\/td>\n32.16%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock<\/em>, Causeway Capital Management<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
RWE<\/td>\n88%<\/td>\nBlackrock, <\/em>Fidelity, Vanguard<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n9%<\/td>\nQatar<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ryanair<\/td>\n48.38%<\/td>\nCapital International Investors, Fidelity, Vanguard<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Safran<\/td>\n41.90%<\/td>\nEuropacific Growth Fund, Aristotle Capital, Vanguard<\/em>, Fidelity<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n11%<\/td>\nFrance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Sanofi<\/td>\n77.80%<\/td>\nDodge & Cox Stock Fund, Morgan Stanley, Blackrock<\/em>, Fischer Asset Management<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SAP<\/td>\n6.30%<\/td>\nBlackrock, <\/em>Dietmar Hopp Stiftung GmbH, Vanguard<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Shell<\/td>\n11.73%<\/td>\nFidelity, Vanguard<\/em>, Morgan Stanley, Blackrock<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n3.03%<\/td>\nNorway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Siemens<\/td>\n67%<\/td>\nBlackrock, Vanguard, EUROPACIFIC GROWTH FUND<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n2.98%<\/td>\nQatar<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Sobi<\/td>\n77.25%<\/td>\nInvestor Aktiebolag, Morgan Stanley, State Street<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n1.24%<\/td>\nNorway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Spotify<\/td>\n62.07%<\/td>\nBaillie Gifford & Co, Blackrock<\/em>, Morgan Stanley, Vanguard<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Stellantis<\/td>\n47.88%<\/td>\nBlackrock, Vanguard<\/em>, Amundi, JP Morgan<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n7.29%<\/td>\nFrance, Norway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
STMicroelectronics<\/td>\n14.85%<\/td>\nBlackrock<\/em>, Goldman Sachs, Grantham<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n27.51%<\/td>\nItaly, France<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Telef\u00f3nica<\/td>\n1.26%<\/td>\nBlackrock<\/em>, Morgan Stanley<\/td>\nYes<\/td>\n9.9%<\/td>\nSpain, Saudi Arabia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TenneT<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\nCurrent<\/td>\n100%<\/td>\nNetherlands<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Thyssenkrupp Steel E.U.<\/td>\n85%<\/td>\nAmundi, Merill Lynch, Vanguard, iShares (Blackrock)<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n3%<\/td>\nNorway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
TotalEnergies<\/td>\n6.94%<\/td>\nFischer Asset Management, Morgan Stanley<\/td>\npartial<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Uber<\/td>\n83.54%<\/td>\nBlackrock, Vanguard<\/em>, Fidelity, State Street<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Vodafone<\/td>\n17.27%<\/td>\nVanguard, Blackrock<\/em>, Legal & General Investment Management, UBS<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n18.01%<\/td>\nUAE, Norway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Volvo<\/td>\n54%<\/td>\nVanguard<\/em>, Oakmark iShares (Blackrock)<\/em><\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
ZF<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\nNo<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\nN\/A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

According to Braun (2020), \u2018Asset Manager Capitalism\u2019<\/em> is dominated by the \u2018Big Three\u2019<\/em>; Blackrock ($10tn AUM), Vanguard ($9.3tn AUM) and State Street ($4.3tn AUM). The Harvard Business Review<\/a><\/span> points out \u2018One of either Blackrock, Vanguard, or State Street is the largest shareholder in 88% of S&P 500 companies<\/em>\u2019. They\u2019re also some of the largest shareholders in each other. Institutional investors (passive\/active funds) now own 80% of all stock in the S&P 500.<\/p>\n

In a study<\/span><\/a> of the Britain\u2019s FTSE350, the 350 largest companies in Britain, the authors found a 20% of its total value was controlled by just ten investors, 10% of which was controlled by Blackrock and Vanguard. The largest foreign owner of the Milan Stock Exchange is Blackrock. According to the OECD in Ireland, Sweden and Poland<\/a><\/span> just three institutional owners control around 20% respectively.<\/p>\n

Naturally, concerns have been expressed that such concentrations of economic and financial power leads to a concentration of political power. With the sector today managing an estimated $100 trillion or so in assets (about two-fifths of the world\u2019s wealth) \u2013 how could it not?<\/p>\n

The Big Three have been described as the “most powerful cartel in history<\/em><\/a><\/span>“, with journalists from Bloomberg describing Blackrock as the \u2018fourth branch<\/span>\u2019<\/em><\/a> of the government. Some have even described asset manager capitalism as an entirely new corporate governance regime. However, the source of this power and the way its wielded is still a matter of contention amongst legal scholars, economists and political economists.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s no question that the Big Three<\/em> want to influence politics at the highest levels. Blackrock has been pouring record amounts into U.S. political campaigns<\/a><\/span>. The same applies in the E.U., where by one estimate they spend an annual \u20ac30m lobbying E.U. institutions<\/a><\/span> to ensure their voices are heard.<\/p>\n

What the Asset Managers Want, they Get<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

What do they want when it comes to a new IP approach? In a word, they want assurance of \u2018investability\u2019<\/em>. But not just any kind of investability. To quote Mark Blyth, the want the state to operate as a kind of \u2018insurer of first resort<\/em>\u2019 whereby it uses the public \u2018balance sheet to insure private investors against losses<\/span>\u2019<\/em>.<\/a><\/p>\n

Accordingly, this is done by \u2018tinkering with risk\/returns on private investments in sovereign bonds, currency, social infrastructure (schools, roads, hospitals and houses, care homes and prisons, water plants and natural parks) and most recently, green industries\u2019 <\/em>(Gabor 2023). This is what political economist Daniela Gabor terms the \u2018derisking state<\/span>\u2019<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

A practical example is public private partnerships (PPP). Here private investors commit to finance public infrastructure projects (hospitals, schools, accommodation, etc) and manage them for a long-time horizon, in return for the state bearing certain risks stipulated in the PPP contract. Risks like an increase in the minimum wage, higher taxes, some new regulation, emissions reductions, etc \u2013 anything which might negatively impact cashflow.<\/p>\n

You see with higher institutional ownership of companies comes higher dividend pay outs. In a study by Buller and Braun (2021)<\/a><\/span> of the largest companies listed on the British stock exchange, they found shareholder pay-outs as a proportion of profits rose substantially \u2018reaching nearly 80% of pre-tax profits at the end of 2020\u2019, <\/em>but productive investment fell.<\/p>\n

Asset managers have also engaged in, and rightly been criticised for, extensive efforts at \u2018greenwashing\u2019<\/em>\u2014misrepresenting investment products as more environmentally sustainable than they really are, while refraining from enforcing ESG principles at their portfolio companies. So, I\u2019m not sure how helpful they will be with Draghi\u2019s decarbonisation efforts.<\/p>\n

As should be clear from the above, the investability relationship forged between the state and capital is one where capital dominates. It\u2019s certainly not the kind of arrangement witnessed during the \u2018golden age\u2019<\/em> of capitalism, or what was seen in the East Asian Tiger economies, when capital was disciplined and directed toward the industries thought most productive.<\/p>\n

As Gabor points out; derisking and capital discipline are fundamentally at odds \u2018because the former relies on private profitability to enlist private capital while the latter forces capital into pursuing the strategic objectives of the state even where these may be at odds with changing market conditions or profit calculations<\/em>.\u2019<\/p>\n

The latter occurred during periods when states were willing and able to do so through means such as nationalising banks to regulate their financial markets, and having their Central Banks impose credit quotas to drive bank lending to what were deemed strategic sectors, often in the presence of capital controls.<\/p>\n

The only real prospect of E.U. member states nationalising banks today would be to bail them out in a crisis, I\u2019m not sure whether credit quotas have ever been employed by the ECB\u2019s constituent Central Banks, and capital controls violate one of the E.U.s four freedoms (free movement of capital).<\/p>\n

There is, however, another way to take a more direct approach: through the capitalisation of new SOEs. Although Draghi is famed for his \u2018whatever it takes<\/em>\u2019 approach from saving the euro, he clearly doesn\u2019t apply this to IP, as demonstrated by the absence of any serious discussion on this.<\/p>\n

Despite the large wave of privatisations that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, and indeed the more recent reduction in the number of SOEs in places like China, the relative importance of state ownership has actually been increasing. As the OECD<\/a><\/span> points out, \u2018the share of SOEs in the list of the top 500 global companies tripled<\/em>\u2019.<\/p>\n

Part 2 takes a closer look at this missing tool from Draghi\u2019s proposed new toolbox, with part 3 considering what possible options Ireland could have with the \u20ac14 billion additional tax revenues it now enjoys, some of which could be used for such investment.<\/em><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/eurostat\/web\/products-euro-indicators\/w\/2-06092024-ap#:~:text=In%20the%20second%20quarter%20of,by%200.3%25%20in%20both%20zones<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Nature Index 2024 Research Leaders<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Tech companies ranked by total revenues for their respective fiscal years ended on or before March 31, 2023<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> 10 biggest banks as measured by market capitalisation.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> These shareholdings are variously held by government Ministries, Central Banks, state pension funds, Sovereign\/Public Investment Banks, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Development Funds and SOEs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This article is the first in a forthcoming three-part series by Cillian Doyle on the role of the state in a mixed economy. Last month there were two seemingly unrelated events which in an Irish context can be connected. On September 9th Mario Draghi\u2019s published his 400-page report on improving E.U. competitiveness. The report provides […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":331,"featured_media":16973,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[299,501,1021,1153,1154,1698,1699,2644,2645,2771,2773,2815,3045,3059,3303,4107,4392,4422,5552,5584,5897,5898,6215,6559,7272,8803,8922,9382,9799,9900,9901,9902],"class_list":["post-16949","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-history-2","tag-adam-tooze","tag-and","tag-blackrock-vanguard-state-street","tag-brics","tag-brics-expansion","tag-cillian-doyle","tag-cillian-doyle-cassandra-voices","tag-draghi-plan-missing","tag-draghis","tag-e-u","tag-e-u-competitiveness","tag-economics","tag-eu-competitiveness","tag-europe-at-the-crossroads","tag-financialisation","tag-history","tag-industrial-policy","tag-institutional-investors","tag-link","tag-lng-exports","tag-mario-draghi","tag-mario-draghi-plan","tag-missing","tag-nextgenerationeu","tag-plan","tag-swift-payment-system","tag-the","tag-thomas-fazi","tag-varoufakis","tag-von-der-leyen","tag-von-der-leyen-commission","tag-von-der-leyen-pro-american"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16949","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/331"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16949"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16949\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16949"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16949"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16949"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}