{"id":2603,"date":"2018-09-07T00:16:35","date_gmt":"2018-09-06T23:16:35","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cassandravoices.com\/?p=2603"},"modified":"2018-09-07T00:16:35","modified_gmt":"2018-09-06T23:16:35","slug":"alternatives-to-italys-political-malaise","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/2018\/09\/07\/alternatives-to-italys-political-malaise\/","title":{"rendered":"Alternatives to Italy’s Political Malaise"},"content":{"rendered":"

Seemingly out-manoeuvred by more experienced, and ruthless, political \u2018partners\u2019, the Five Star Movement (M5S) has entered a crucial phase after forming a coalition government with the right wing La Lega. The key question is whether the issue of immigration will continue to dominate Italian political debate<\/a>, or whether M5S can bring about meaningful social reforms. For the moment it is advantage La Lega.<\/em><\/p>\n

I \u2013 La Lega Leading the New Government<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

After three months the new Italian government composed of M5S and La Lega<\/em> is facing difficulties in aligning a complex mix of political leaders, many of whom are in power for the first time. The clash of conflicting ideas and constituencies, played out in newspaper articles and websites, brings to mind \u2013 not only to foreign observers \u2013 a stereotype of Italian political chaos.<\/p>\n

The \u2018yellow\u2019 (as MS5 are referred), having earned 32.4% of the national vote in the March election, on the basis of an economic platform leaning towards socialism, should be leading the coalition. But this mantle seems to have been usurped by the minority \u2018green\u2019 (La Lega<\/em>) partner, which gained 17.6% of the vote. The has been achieved through Le Pen-ist propaganda, focusing on migration, security issues and Euro-scepticism, while winking to Trumpism (and esteem for Vladimir Putin).<\/p>\n

Matteo Salvini, the leader of La Lega<\/em> has emerged as the public face (and sole heir of Lega<\/em> father Umberto Bossi<\/a>, following his forced retirement after charges of public finance misuse) of the government. He is Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior; while his supposed ally, and interlocutor, Luigi Di Maio, the leader of M5S, is Minister for Labour and Economic Development. The factions are supposedly being coordinated by Premier Giuseppe Conte, the M5S nominee.<\/p>\n

Salvini has injected atavistic fears of a foreign \u2018other\u2019 into political debate, highlighting criminality and legality, loss of jobs and waste of resources, as well as undeserved social spending in a period of economic crisis. Within days of entering office he stated to the media that he wished to divert five billion euros from migrant reception and integration policies, while ramping up anti-EU rhetoric.<\/p>\n

In June 2018 he closed Italian ports \u2013 in particular the ports of Sicily \u2013 to the \u2018Acquarius\u2019<\/em>, a ship from the fleet of the NGO \u2018SOS Mediterran\u00e8e\u2019<\/em>\u00a0(MSF \u2013 \u2018Doctors Without Borders\u2019<\/em>), sailing from Libya with six-hundred-and-twenty-nine migrants (including one-hundred-and-twenty-three unaccompanied minors) aboard, which had previously been prevented from entering La Valletta in Malta.<\/p>\n

Salvini invited the captain, \u2018to continue the crusade with all its comfortable services along the Mediterranean costs\u2019, as far as Valencia, Spain, where the new Spanish Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez authorized it to dock. He then told another ship the \u2018Lifeline<\/em>\u2019 it had no chance of entering Italian ports, and went on to ask his EU partners to consider radical changes in EU migration policies.<\/p>\n

On August 2018, he created an internal conflict within the Italian Guardia costiera<\/em> (\u2018Coastal Guard\u2019), prohibiting another ship, the \u2018Dicotti<\/em>\u2019,<\/em>\u00a0from unloading one-hundred-and-fifty migrants in Catania, Sicily, and then instigated what seems to have been a politically motivated investigation into the Agrigento public prosecutor Luigi Patronaggio on several charges, including abduction and segregation, illegal detention and abuse of public administration.<\/p>\n

At the end of August 2018 he met the anti-EU and Far Right leader of Hungary Viktor Orban, theorizing on the so-called Democratura<\/em>, or \u2018Authoritarian Democracy\u2019, while endorsing the Hungarian leader\u2019s policy of closing his country\u2019s borders to migrants.<\/p>\n

Astonishingly, according to a majority of Italian commentators, in view of recent polls, Salvini had mastered the situation and, by escalating declarations, had emerged as a real political animal, front and centre of the political stage, to the detriment of the M5S.<\/p>\n

In reality Salvini has been in election mode since the formation of the government, as he awaits another opportunity to go to the polls, with surveys showing his party appealing up to 30% of the electorate<\/a>. This could allow his party to\u00a0reconcile with former allies, and enter a coalition with the former fascisti Fratelli d\u2019Italia<\/em> or Silvio Berlusconi\u2019s Forza Italia<\/em>.<\/p>\n

II \u2013 Transatlantic Connections<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

But the rapture of opinion writers can be misleading. Another Matteo (Renzi)\u2019s recent adventures have shown the volatility of Italian voting intentions in an era of social media. Nothing should be taken for grant at this early stage in the electoral cycle.<\/p>\n

Certainly Salvini\u2019s political position has been strengthened by an axis with other Populist forces in Europe and throughout the world. Apart from reciprocal cuddles with Marine Le Pen, and the muscular chest-to-chest recognition by Putin, there are also bonds with the US Presidency. This has served to legitimate him and his party.<\/p>\n

Salvini and other Italian right-wing parties see the 2016 US Presidential election as a sign of a shift in Euro-Atlantic politics away from buonismo<\/em>, and \u2018human rights-oriented policies\u2019 deemed to be weak, inefficient and unpopular<\/p>\n

Indeed, Attaccateve al Trump,<\/em>\u00a0a book by\u00a0Paola Tommasi<\/a>, with a degree of notoriety in Italy, credits the dissolution of the Italian Christian Democrats with the unlikely election, \u2018Berlusconi-style\u2019, of the outsider Trump.<\/p>\n

Steve Bannon<\/a> \u2013 Trump\u2019s former consultant and spin-doctor \u2013 has hailed La Lega<\/em> as a part of the constellation of \u2018Breitbart\u2019 (and perhaps Cambridge Analytica?) declaring with some confidence that \u2018the Italian fellows are doing a good job\u2019. Subsequently, Trump, while fomenting against Trudeau (as he travelled back to Washington from last June\u2019s G-7 in Canada), recognized Italy as a primary political partner and warmly welcomed the new Italian policy on migrants.<\/p>\n

Tellingly, both governments during their first days, created a storm over migration issues. Trump followed up victory by imposing visa restrictions on migrants arriving from selected countries, which generated street protests in the principal US cities. He has recently had to cope with a reversal in public approval on account of the shameful separation of children from their parents at the US-Mexico border, and incarceration in small cages, but his wife Melania<\/a>\u2019s apparent repentance was perhaps designed to balance the effect.<\/p>\n

Salvini\u2019s declarations on migrants issues also unleashed an emotional wave, expressed in national press and television, where commentators weighed in to contest human rights violations and defend the previous government\u2019s policies.<\/p>\n

But, as indicated, the overall effect on voting intentions appears to have been favourable for Salvini. Recent polls suggest his anti-intellectualism, and jibes about\u00a0buonism<\/em>, have galvanized a significant part of population. Many appear to appreciate his \u2018muscular\u2019 approach both in internal affairs, and in dealings with EU partners.<\/p>\n

III \u2013 Democratic Impasse<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Democratic Party, out of Palazzo Chigi<\/em> since the March elections, ending the premiership of Paolo Gentiloni, but with\u00a0Matteo Renzi still on board, have proved ineffectual in opposition. A new leadership has still not emerged, and the old one never developed a comprehensive political platform for these challenging times, apart from to say: \u2018we lost, it is up to them to govern\u2019; meaning, in essence, \u2018we remain on the side of the river hoping that corpses of political adversaries will pass by\u2019.<\/p>\n

The new (transitional) political secretary Maurizio Martina – appointed after the electoral collapse to keep a steady course before the next congress \u2013 has, unsurprisingly, inveighed against Salvini. In parliament there have been many pious statements from ambitious Democrat deputies attacking the approach of the\u00a0Lega<\/em> leader, but meaningful initiatives have been lacking thus far.<\/p>\n

After falling from a high of 40% in the European elections of 2014 to just 19% in the March election a perception has emerged of a distinct lack of consensus in the Democratic Party.\u00a0Energy has been wasted on strategies designed to compete with other party\u2019s web presences, without producing any visible impact or, even worse, running an \u2018opposition within an opposition\u2019, against the left wing (\u2018former communists\u2019), who are castigated for not toeing the leadership\u2019s line.<\/p>\n

The fallen \u2018Matteo\u2019 underestimated the ill-effects of simplistic proposals on institutional reforms, investing too much rhetoric on the efficiency and rapidity of political outcomes. He remained devoted to a Blairite\u00a0\u2018third way\u2019, without any deep reflection on the future of centre-left politics in an era of shifting economic and technological plates. There were no original policies on equality or redistribution of wealth, no\u00a0weltanschaung<\/em><\/a> for Democrats in the years to come.<\/p>\n

Affected by a curious \u2018Zelig<\/a>-style\u2019 syndrome, leading to the party co-opting other parties\u2019 proposals (on immigration, public funding of politics and cutting costs of institutions), the Democrats under \u2018Matteo the 1st\u2019 shared with \u2018Matteo the 2nd\u2019 a certain \u2018muscularity\u2019 in the tone adopted towards European partners, political adversaries (within and outside the Party), bureaucracies and allegedly \u2018strong powers\u2019. But they never renounced an associations with large corporations or the institutions of European financial orthodoxy, as they sought to retain the support of a shrinking constituency of moderates.<\/p>\n

As a result, left-wing supporters left the party in droves, especially to the M5S. Beffa delle beffe<\/em>, though not unexpectedly, at the last elections even former moderates seemed to prefer the more consistent right-wing voice of La Lega<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The Democratic \u2018Matteo\u2019 has divided his own party \u2013 and wider Italian society \u2013 pitching two sides against one another. One derives from the Catholic Democrazia Cristiana<\/em> (later Popolari<\/em> and Margherita<\/em>), while the other stems from the former Partito Comunista Italiano<\/em> (later Partito Democratico della Sinistra<\/em> and finally Democratici di Sinistra<\/em>).<\/p>\n

\"\"
Aldo Moro – compromesso historico.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

After the election, ignoring the lesson of one of its greatest leader Aldo Moro \u2013 the great exponent of compromesso\u00a0<\/em>storico<\/em> between Christian Democrats and Communists \u2013 he refused to countenance any convergence on social issues with the M5S.<\/p>\n

In this depressing scenario, a strong answer to Salvini came from Roberto Speranza, the young leader of Liberi e Uguali<\/em>\u00a0(\u2018Free and Equal\u2019), the political party that emerged from those groups leaving the Democrats before the elections, under the leadership of Massimo D\u2019Alema, former Premier and Communist leader, in opposition to Matteo Renzi. Speranza reported Salvini to the prosecutors\u2019 office in Rome for instigating racial hatred.<\/p>\n

Indeed numerous public declarations and decisions taken by the green-yellow alliance appear inconsistent with constitutional values, and international laws to which Italy is bound by treaty.<\/p>\n

In the \u2018Acquarius<\/em>\u2019\u00a0case, as in the more recent \u2018Dicotti<\/em>\u2019\u00a0case, Sicily was the safest port to dock, rather than Valencia. Any practice by Italian military forces involving returning migrants to Libya before security and peaceful conditions have been restored runs contrary to the European Court of Human Rights-stated principle of \u2018non refoulement<\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n

IV \u2013 What does the M5S Stand For?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

As regards the M5S, which is based on the principle of digital democracy and contesting Italian \u2018cast\u2019 politics and patronage, it is not clear what it stands for.<\/p>\n

Doubts have been raised about its initial roots in a project of \u2018community behavioural analysis<\/a>\u2019 by one of its founders, the \u2018Internet guru\u2019 Roberto Casaleggio, who died in 2016, but whose legacy has been carried on by his son Davide, with even greater efficiency.<\/p>\n

M5S is associated with a private consultancy firm that seemingly derives financial gains from political information and advertising. The firm can also organize political communication and harness the vote of M5S, contrary to democratic principles enshrined in the Italian Constitution, which predicates democratic participation on political organizations, and freedom of individual political consciousness.<\/p>\n

A stronger juridical stance against these new forms of political organization risks having any decision being twisted to reinforce populism. Moreover, any rejection by the court of such charges would be a sign of the failure of traditional constitutional instruments.<\/p>\n

A finding against M5S would solidify a public perception that public institutions are anti-democratic \u2013 just as when the government was being formed President Mattarella was accused by the \u2018piazza<\/em>\u2019 of inappropriate interference over blocking the appointment of Paolo Savona<\/a> as Minister of the Economy.<\/p>\n

What then for the new Matteo? Time runs fast but it is too early to appreciate the impact of Salvini\u2019s strategies, in particular if he will last better than the \u2018other Matteo\u2019 on the prow of the Italian Government ship, and in the hearts of (certain) Italians. While a significant constituency has been galvanised by what appears to be a certain strength of personality, still the percentage of Italians who have ever gone as far as voting for La Lega<\/em> amounts to a mere 5.6 million, out of over 51 millions of voters.<\/p>\n

Far more of Italy\u2019s citizens are seeking new voices supporting civic ideals, under a new Democratic leadership.<\/p>\n

A turning point might be the opposition within the M5S to common political action with La Lega<\/em>. This has already been seen at local level since the beginning of unnatural alliance: in June 2018, in response to Salvin\u2019s repeated denunciation of migrants, Mr. Nicola Sguera, a city council member in Benevento, resigned declaring \u2018We hoped for \u2018Podemos\u2019, now we have \u2018Orban\u2019\u2019; for similar reasons Carlotta Trevisan resigned her role as deputy president of the city council in Rivoli.<\/p>\n

At a national level their leader Di Maio has hushed up criticisms declaring: \u2018I want suggestions, not complaint: now we run the government\u2019, and recently declared in Versilia, that \u2018misunderstanding and conflicts are not surprising, we will do our best\u2019, and that \u2018blockages and \u2018refoulments\u2019 cannot be made with kindness\u2019.<\/p>\n

However, the recent Roman meetings of M5S, before and after the summer parliamentary recess, witnessed further grumbling by the left-wing of the movement, led by Senate President Roberto Fico, who declared, contradicting Salvini and his leader Di Maio, that \u2018Italian Ports shall remain open to NGOs, they are doing an essential job\u201d.<\/p>\n

Moreover, Barbara Lezzi, Minister for the South, Senators Elena Fattori, Paola Nugnes and Luigi Gallo are among the deputies showing commitment to the idea that \u2018refoulments\u2019 are not a policy appropriate for a civilised country. Fico also came out against the meeting on August 28th between Salvini and Orban, declaring, \u2018there\u2019s no political leader more distant from me in Europe\u2019.<\/p>\n

Worse still, after the meeting between the two Far Right leaders and the final declarations on a common stance in Europe (with the schizophrenic Salvini supporting the Orban position against migrant re-locations in the European Union, contrary the official position of his government), Prime Minister Conte leaked to the media that it was no longer possible to have an official public position.<\/p>\n

V \u2013 The Reality About Immigration<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

The political context could easily evolve differently between the right-wing La Lega<\/em> politics and the leftist M5S, which is animated in particular by opposition to the elitist politics of the Democrats, and is still rooted in the family photo album of la sinistra italiana<\/em>.<\/p>\n

There is a compelling argument that the whole \u2018immigration affair\u2019 is a lot of hot air, and part of a complex public relations campaign being orchestrated by unscrupulous politicians \u2018senza arte n\u00e9 parte<\/em>\u2019 (\u2018without any virtue nor strong political faith\u2019), for whom the M5S is naively providing a stage and microphone.<\/p>\n

Its impact is increased by the inability of Italy and the EU more generally \u2013 blackmailed in part by their own constituencies \u2013 to agree on a real and effective common migration policy.<\/p>\n

According to official United Nations reports, collected in the World Population Prospects \u2013 and reported in the \u2018Huffington Post\u2019 in 2017<\/a> – migratory flows into Europe from 2000 to 2010 were 1.2 million people per year, which makes up a mere 0.2% out of a population of five hundred million inhabitants (one million have arrived in the United States over the same period).<\/p>\n

That figure then dramatically fell to 400,000 entries per year between 2010 and 2015 due to the Economic Crisis, which led to less money being remitted to sustain travel costs<\/a> from Central, Western or Eastern Africa to Europe.<\/p>\n

According to \u2018Liberazione<\/em><\/a>\u2019, these numbers will have declined further in 2018: 8% less have disembarked on the Italian coast than in the same period last year. Data from the Ministry of the Interior indicates that 14,441 people arrived in Italy by sea in the first six months of 2018, while 64,033 had arrived in the same period of the previous year. This is not to say international migration is not a genuine issue, but it puts it in perspective.<\/p>\n

In 2015 the United Nations said international migration had reached 244 millions per annum, 20 millions of whom were refugees. That number had grown from 154 millions in 1990 to 175 millions in 2000. Migrations will persist as long as economic cleavages exists between rich and poor countries. The real point is the small proportion of those, about one million, actually entering Europe, the biggest economy in the world (comprising 23.8% of the world\u2019s GDP, against the 22.2% of the US), with 500 million inhabitants, compared to total migrations around the world.<\/p>\n

The essential issue is how to adopt efficient, humane and stable institutions for the governance of humanitarian emergencies and economic migration to Europe.<\/p>\n

Instruments to deal with economic migrations are not easy to be put in place. Decisions touch on political ties with foreign states, anachronistic colonial attitudes, distribution of military and security power, sovereignty over international waters, irrational beliefs and ancient fears, as well as normative politics.<\/p>\n

Meaningful measures are, however, on the table for European governments to discuss. For instance, Angela Merkel recently proposed a common EU force for border control. Indeed, even in the absence of intense passions, a European Agenda on Migrations has been debated since 2013 among EU leaders, and the Migration Compact proposed by the previous Italian Government envisaged a scheme for infrastructural investment in Africa.<\/p>\n

In this context, the EU\u2019s \u2018La Valletta Fund\u2019 continues to provide financial support to projects tackling the \u2018root causes\u2019 of migrations in selected African countries. The new strategy of the European External Action Service \u2013 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the EU \u2013 includes closer ties and relationships with Europe’s \u2018neighbours\u2019, and the \u2018neighbours of the neighbours\u2019 from where migrants leave for Europe (not only North Africa, but also Sahara and Sahel countries).<\/p>\n

The EU social agenda, debated since 2015, also contemplates rules and measures for social integration of migrants, within a larger scheme tackling the labour concerns of all Europeans, which could reduce social tensions.<\/p>\n

VI \u2013 Three Scenarios<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

A responsible Italian leadership would initiate debate on these issues with other EU Member States. In contrast, at the last EU Council meeting an apparent \u2018political crisis\u2019 between Conte and some EU partners (Macron, Merkel, and Borissov) was reported.<\/p>\n

The Dublin Regulation should be overhauled, but narrow nationalist politics is creating stasis in the Union, and the Italian government\u2019s intransigence is not helping matters.<\/p>\n

The only positive news stemming from the muscular stance of the yellow-green alliance is renewed (enduring?) attention being paid to the migrant question, and to Italy as a strategic stronghold for a federal Europe, meaning the country could finally reap concrete political advantages as regards sharing the costs of receiving migrants.<\/p>\n

Salvini has gone so far as to warn that if the rules are not changed on migration then Italy will withdraw its annual contribution.<\/p>\n

It remains to be seen whether M5S leaders \u2013 presumably to the left of Di Maio \u2013 will be able to counterbalance this\u00a0\u2018green\u2019 communication agenda. Can that faction defuse the \u2018immigration affair\u2019 and the radicalising narratives of La Lega<\/em>? Will they succeed in reversing the positions they had to swallow to gain the levers of power, and finally make their 32% of electoral votes correspond with real political power?<\/p>\n

One opportunity for the inexperienced M5S and its leaders \u2013 in contrast La Lega <\/em>as\u00a0La Lega Norde<\/em>\u00a0was in local government from the 1980s and national politics from the 90s \u2013 is to implement their economic and social platform, from which Salvini\u2019s \u2018immigration issue\u2019 has diverted attention.<\/p>\n

These include the reddito di cittadinanza<\/em> (\u2018basic social income\u2019) it promised voters, and long-standing environmental commitments, including the closure or modernisation of the ILVA iron plant in Taranto, and the blockage or relocation of the docking of the \u2018Trans-Adriatic Pipeline\u2019 in Puglia.<\/p>\n

\"\"
The current route of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

There is also the issue of investment in social housing and infrastructures for workers, active employment policies and the restructuring of unemployment agencies, digitalisation and other services for SMEs, simplification of laws, and incentives\u00a0for youth entrepreneurship.<\/p>\n

Recently Di Maio, now heading a monstre<\/em> Ministry reuniting Labour with Economic Development (Industry), has initiated an investigation into the feasibility of basic income, against the indifference or opposition of his La Lega<\/em> partners. On these points, the interests of the historical Lega<\/em> constituencies and the expectations of M5S supporters might seriously diverge.<\/p>\n

La Lega<\/em>\u2019s leadership in the north of Italy, after years of regional and local governments, are perceived as guarantors of established commercial interests, tied to the former Forza Italia<\/em>\u00a0barons of the northern economy. Any M5S initiatives implying significant redistribution of public resources seem likely to create rifts.<\/p>\n

The more the M5S pursues social and economic priorities the greater the prospect of divergence with La Lega<\/em>. But if M5S renounces these social policies they risk division into right and left factions, just like the Democratic Party before them, making its prospects in the next elections uncertain. Failure to act could generate new alliances before the next elections.<\/p>\n

Would this mean glory for the \u2018green\u2019 \u2018Matteo\u2019? Two scenarios present themselves to Italian citizens in the medium term. The first is an abrupt end to the coalition, involving a never-ending cycle of elections, in which La Lega<\/em> pickpockets the right wing M5S votes, and attracts new voters from traditional centre-right parties; or perhaps restoring a political dowry to the prodigal son Silvio Berlusconi, and his centre-right\u00a0Forza Italia<\/em> heirs.<\/p>\n

The second scenario is a revitalized (inspired by Spain\u2019s Socialists perhaps) \u2018Democratic Party\u2019 leadership emerging to end the short-lived Matteo II\u2019s era in Italian politics, supporting dialogue with the M5S , under Fico, and reviving the social movements that Matteo I sank<\/p>\n

This could bring an end to the financial and economic stalemate which has ruined so many firms and families, unravelling a delicate social fabric so as to give an opportunity to demagogues like Salvini.<\/p>\n

Nothing is shaped until everything is shaped. A third scenario could play out where the M5S and La Lega<\/em> develop ties at institutional levels, and become an inseparable Populist force. To the leadership of the Democrats, and the new forces emerging in Italian civil society, the hard task is to play the cards in front of them.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Seemingly out-manoeuvred by more experienced, and ruthless, political \u2018partners\u2019, the Five Star Movement (M5S) has entered a crucial phase after forming a coalition government with the right wing La Lega. The key question is whether the issue of immigration will continue to dominate Italian political debate, or whether M5S can bring about meaningful social reforms. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":75,"featured_media":2700,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6,1],"tags":[197],"class_list":["post-2603","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-global","category-uncategorized","tag-2018september"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2603","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/75"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2603"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2603\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2603"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2603"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/casswp.eutonom.eu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2603"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}